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Introduction
This article explores the ways in which the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
("CEDAW")' has been implemented in the United Kingdom ("UK")
and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China ("Hong
Kong"). We have selected these two jurisdictions in part because
there are many common features in their legal systems and in their
approaches to sex discrimination. As a British colony, Hong Kong
inherited English common law, and the Hong Kong legal system
' This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Feminism and Human Rights
session of the Annual Meeting of the Law & Society Association, Budapest, July 4,
2001. Research for the Hong Kong portion of the article was supported by a grant
from the Hong Kong Research Grants Council (RGC Reference HKU 7721/00H).
* Carole J. Petersen is an Associate Professor and the Director of the Centre for
Comparative & Public Law, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong. Harriet Sa-
muels is a Senior Lecturer, University of Westminster, London, England.
1. G.A. Res. 180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N. Doc.
A/34/46 (1979) (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981). Strictly speaking, the abbreviation
CEDAW only refers to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women (the enforcement body for the Convention, which is discussed later in this
article). However, it has become common to refer to the Convention itself as
CEDAW and to refer to the Committee as the "CEDAW Committee," and this is
the terminology that we have adopted in this article.
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continues to reflect a strong British influence (despite the resumption
of Chinese sovereignty in 1997). The international human rights
treaties that were ratified by the UK on behalf of Hong Kong also
continue to apply there. Moreover, both the UK and Hong Kong
have experienced increased public awareness of international human
rights standards in the past decade. In the UK, this has been brought
about by its greater integration with Europe and the enactment of the
Human Rights Act 1998,2 which incorporated the European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms3 into
domestic law. In Hong Kong, public awareness arose during the
transition period leading to its return to China. During this time, the
Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance' was enacted, which thereby
incorporated the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(the "ICCPR") into Hong Kong domestic law.
However, there are also important cultural and political
differences between the two jurisdictions. Unlike the UK, Hong
Kong has never enjoyed a democratic system of government, either as
a British colony or as a Special Administrative Region of China. In
addition, legal recognition of women's right to equality has come
rather late to Hong Kong. Hong Kong's Sex Discrimination
Ordinance5 is largely based upon the British Sex Discrimination Act
1975, but it was not enacted in Hong Kong until 1995. CEDAW was
not applied to Hong Kong until 1996, a full decade after the UK's
ratification. Although the Hong Kong government has often
attributed this slow development of women's equality to cultural
factors, the lack of democracy also played an important role.
Ironically, despite the late arrival of CEDAW, our research indicates
that it is having a more practical impact in Hong Kong than in the
UK, largely because Hong Kong women's organisations are making
more use of CEDAW in their current lobbying efforts.
Part I of this article provides an introduction to CEDAW and its
enforcement mechanisms. Parts II and III analyse the
implementation of CEDAW in the two jurisdictions, including the
extent to which CEDAW is considered in public policy making, the
extent to which the judiciary has relied upon CEDAW in deciding
2. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.).
3. European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950,213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Feb. 3, 1953).
4. Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, 1991, c. 383 (H.K.).
5. Sex Discrimination Ordinance, 1995, c. 480 (H.K.).
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cases, and the participation of non-governmental organisations
("NGOs") in the reporting process. NGO participation is assessed in
the context of the development of the women's movement in the two
jurisdictions, relying upon shadow reports and other documents
produced by NGOs, interviews with NGO representatives, and the
authors' experiences working with NGOs in Hong Kong. Part IV
concludes with our analysis of the similarities and differences in the
two jurisdictions and the opportunities for better implementation of
CEDAW.
I. CEDAW and its Enforcement Process
CEDAW was adopted by the General Assembly in 1979 and
went into force in 1981. It is one of the United Nations' six core
human rights treaties and the major treaty governing women's status.
CEDAW was largely the result of lobbying by women, who argued
that existing human rights instruments failed adequately to address
women's rights. As a product of the 1970s, it largely embraces the
"sameness" theory of equality, seeking equal opportunities for
women and legal equality with men. However, CEDAW is also
concerned with equality of result and it does, therefore, permit
positive discrimination in favour of women.6 CEDAW is also
noteworthy for addressing discrimination in private spheres, including
cultural practices and the family.7 In particular, Article 2 expressly
obligates States Parties to "take all appropriate measures, including
legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs
and practices that constitute discrimination against women."
CEDAW established a Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women8 ("CEDAW Committee"), which
monitors compliance with the treaty. The CEDAW Committee
consists of twenty-three experts elected by the States Parties, who
serve in their personal capacities. The primary function of the
CEDAW Committee is to receive and consider the reports of States
Parties submitted under Article 18. CEDAW has been widely
ratified and now has more States Parties than any other human rights
6. CEDAW art. 4.
7. Compare the definition of discrimination in Art. 1(1) of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (which refers to discrimination
in "the political, economic, social, cultural, or any other field of public life") with that
in Art. 1 of CEDAW (which refers instead to discrimination in "the political, eco-
nomic, social, cultural, civil or any other field").
8. CEDAW art. 17.
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treaty other than the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
However, CEDAW also has an unprecedented number of wide-
ranging reservations, some of which undermine the central tenets of
the treaty.' Other criticisms that have been made of the treaty
include the emphasis on equality with men, the lack of provisions on
violence against women, and the absence of a full right to property.'"
However, the CEDAW Committee has made an effort to address
some of these issues through its general recommendations."
Women also frequently complain that CEDAW is not
adequately enforced. Article 18 requires States Parties to submit an
initial report within one year of ratification and to report every four
years thereafter on the implementation of the treaty in their
respective jurisdictions. The reports should describe the "legislative,
judicial, administrative or other measures" that have been adopted to
give effect to the Convention. 2 A weakness in the reporting process
is that certain States Parties fail to submit their reports on time, a
violation for which there is no real sanction. However, this has not
generally been a problem for the UK and Hong Kong governments,
as they both take the reporting deadlines and other formal
requirements of international human rights treaties quite seriously.
Another problem is that there has been a backlog of reports, and
some reports have not been reviewed in a timely manner. The
CEDAW Committee is attempting to address this and held an extra
session, in August 2002, to reduce the backlog of reports.'3
9. The CEDAW Committee has objected to the practice of entering extensive
reservations, including those based upon traditional, religious, or cultural practices
that are incompatible with CEDAW. See CEDAW COMMITTEE, "RESERVATIONS TO
CEDAW," available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations.htm
(last visited Jan. 29, 2003).
10. See Fiona Beveridge & Siobhan Mullally, International Human Rights and
Body Politics, in LAW AND BODY POLITICS: REGULATING THE FEMALE BODY 240-273
(Aldershot: Dartmouth 1.995); Andrew Byrnes, The "Other" Human Rights Treaty
Body: The Work of the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 6 (1989).
11. See CEDAW art. 21 (empowering the CEDAW Committee to make sugges-
tions and general recommendations). For examples of general recommendations that
address some of the "gaps" in CEDAW, see General Recommendations No. 12 (8th
session, 1989) and 19 (11th session, 1992) on violence against women; General Rec-
ommendation No. 13 (8th session, 1989) on equal pay for work of equal value; and
General Recommendation No. 14 (9th session, 1990) on female circumcision.
12. CEDAW art. 18.
13. At its twenty-fifth session the CEDAW Committee adopted Decision 25/1,
which noted that there were a significant number of reports of States Parties awaiting
consideration and requested the General Assembly to approve, on an exceptional
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Although the lack of real sanctions makes it a fairly soft
enforcement process, the duty to submit reports is still the most
important mechanism for enforcing international human rights
treaties. " To a large extent, compliance depends upon the extent to
which a government wishes to be, viewed as an active participant in
the United Nations human rights treaties and to receive good marks
from the CEDAW Committee. As Sally Merry, who has studied
CEDAW in the context of violence against women, has observed:
The central regulatory feature of the Convention and its hearings is
the definition and naming of problems and the articulation of
solutions within a prestigious global forum. National and
international NGOs as well as other international actors endeavour
to shame non-compliant governments. This is not a system of
sanctions, but a cultural system whose coin is admission into the
international community of human-rights-compliant states.
5
When drafting its report, a State Party is expected to assess its
own performance and the problems within its jurisdiction. Moreover,
if done with appropriate publicity and input from the public, the
process of drafting the report should raise awareness of the treaty and
improve dialogue between the government and interested NGOs.
16
The CEDAW Committee has been particularly receptive to the
involvement of NGOs, and has encouraged governments to involve
them in the drafting of government reports. In this regard, CEDAW
has benefited from the work of the International Women's Rights
Action Watch ("IWRAW"), an international women's organisation
focusing on the work of the CEDAW Committee. IWRAW monitors
compliance with CEDAW, supplies information, and supports NGOs
who are preparing shadow reports.17
basis, a special three-week session in August 2002 to be devoted entirely to reducing
the backlog of reports. See the announcement of the "CEDAW Exceptional Ses-
sion" at the website of the Division for the Advancement of Women, available at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/exsess.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2003).
14. MICHAEL 0' FLAHERTY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UN: PRACTICE BEFORE
THE TREATY BODIES 1-3 (1996).
15. Sally Engle Merry, A New Global Legality? Unpacking the CEDAW Process
10 (Mar. 2001) (unpublished manuscript presented at the Wenner-Gren conference,
Violence Between Inmates, Globalization, and the State) (copy on file with authors).
16. CEDAW has produced guidelines for the preparation of reports. See Guide-
lines for the Preparation of Reports by States, CEDAW/C/7/Rev.3.
17. See Jane Conners, NGOs and the Human Rights of Women at the UN, in THE
CONSCIENCE OF THE WORLD: THE INFLUENCE OF NON GOVERNMENT
ORGANISATIONS IN THE UN SYSTEM 147-181 (Peter Willetts ed., 1996).
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Participating in the reporting process can empower those
involved and provide opportunities for collaboration and coalition
building among NGOs, as well as with relevant government
departments. NGOs may also produce their own "shadow reports."
This is important because governments tend to provide an overly
positive assessment of women's conditions. NGO reports can
challenge that assessment and provide alternative statistics or
analyses. O'Flaherty'9 notes that if NGOs are heavily involved in the
drafting of the government report, then it may be regarded as a joint
effort, which could prevent NGOs from adopting an independent
stance from the government. It is best if NGOs can produce one or
more of their own reports, even if they are consulted during the
drafting of the government report."
NGO attention can make the public more aware of the
government report and convince the media of the newsworthiness of
the entire reporting process. NGOs can also monitor the extent to
which a government honours any promises made to the CEDAW
Committee. An example of the crucial role played by such
organisations is documented by UNIFEM in Bringing Equality
Home, where it describes the government of Zimbabwe as producing
a glowing report to the CEDAW Committee with the centrepiece
being the Legal Age of Majority Act 1982.21 Shortly after presenting
the report, there were moves for the legislation to be repealed.
However, NGOs who had been active during the reporting process
campaigned to defend the legislation and to ensure that the
government was held accountable for the promises made to the
CEDAW Committee.22
18. See Afra Afsharipour, Empowering Ourselves: The Role of Women's NGOs
in the Enforcement of the Women's Convention, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 129 (1999), which
includes a case-study of how NGO participation helped to pressure the government
of Bangladesh to take its obligations under CEDAW more seriously.
19. O'FLAHERTY, supra note 14, at 6.
20. There is a useful summary of the procedure for producing a shadow report in
Producing NGO Shadow Reports to CEDAW: A Procedural Guide (IWRAW 1996),
available at http://iwraw.igc.org/ngo/guide (last visited Jan. 29, 2003).
21. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT FUND FOR WOMEN (UNIFEM), BRINGING
EQUALITY HOME: IMPLEMENTING THE CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL
FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN § V (Ilana Landsberg-Lewis ed., 1998),
available at http://www.unifem.undp.org/cedaw/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2003).
22. Unfortunately the impact of the legislation was severely restricted by the Su-
preme Court in the Magaya Case. See The International Women's Rights Action
Watch (IWRAW), Two Steps Back: Customary Law and the Zimbabwe Constitution,
13 THE WOMEN'S WATCH No. I (Sept. 1999), available at
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The CEDAW Committee will allocate a country rapporteur who
is responsible for reading the government report and background
information supplied by the government and NGOs. Before the
formal hearing of the report, a four-person pre-sessional group
prepares questions, which are then conveyed to the relevant
government to be answered during the opening session.23 NGOs are
also invited to orally present information to the pre-sessional working
group, and since January 1999 they may make oral statements on
reports at the public meetings of the Committee.24 The aim is to have
a constructive dialogue between Committee members and
representatives of the government, enabling the State Party to further
evaluate its position. Unfortunately, in practice, many government
representatives view their role in the hearing as primarily to defend
their government's position (and are probably directed by their
governments to assume that role).
After the hearing, the country rapporteur will usually be assigned
to write the Concluding Comments of the Committee.25 Of course,
the CEDAW Committee cannot compel the State Party to implement
these suggestions, but they do provide an important lobbying tool for
NGOs. IWRAW maintains that the Concluding Comments are "the
crucial product for NGO action" as they constitute "a public
statement given to the government that specifies further action
required to live up to its obligations under the Convention., 26 The
Concluding Comments also provide an authoritative interpretation of
the obligations under the treaty.
The recent adoption of the Optional Protocol to CEDAW is one
of the most important reforms designed to enhance enforcement of
the treaty.27 Activists and NGOs lobbied for the Optional Protocol at
the Vienna Convention on Human Rights and the Fourth World
http://www.igc.org/iwraw/publications/ww/9909.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2003)
[hereinafter IWRAW].
23. The procedure for Initial Reports is different than that of periodic reports as
questions are not drafted in advance and the time allocated to such sessions is
shorter.
24. Mara R. Bustelo, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women at the Crossroads, in THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY
MONITORING 79-111 (Phillip Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000).
25. IWRAW, supra note 20, at 5.
26. Id.
27. See Andrew Byrnes & Jane Connors, Enforcing the Human Rights of Women:
A Complaints Procedure for the Women's Convention?, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 679
(1996).
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Conference on Women, which was held in Beijing in 1995.28 A
Working Group of the Commission on the Status of Women took
four years to negotiate the language. The Optional Protocol was
adopted by the General Assembly on October 6, 1999 and opened for
signature on Human Rights Day. 9 The Optional Protocol provides
two important mechanisms. First, a communications procedure
allows individuals or groups of individuals who claim to be victims to
assert that there has been a violation of any of the rights in CEDAW,
provided that they have first exhausted local remedies." Second, an
inquiry procedure allows the Committee itself to investigate "grave or
systematic" violations of the rights in the treaty by a State Party.31
Although some NGOs had argued for wider rules of standing to
allow anyone with a sufficient interest to bring a complaint and for
more open procedures,32 the Optional Protocol was generally
welcomed by women's organisations. It is consistent with the practice
of other major human rights conventions and is part of a more
general strategy to mainstream women's human rights throughout the
United Nations. The interpretations of the treaty adopted by the
CEDAW Committee when deciding complaints are likely to be relied
upon by other human rights bodies when considering women's issues
within their own remit. They may also be referred to by courts if they
look to CEDAW for guidance in interpreting domestic laws.
Thus far there are seventy-four signatories to the Optional
Protocol and thirty-nine States Parties.33 Interestingly, all of the UK's
European Union partners have either signed or ratified the Protocol.
However, the UK government has stated that it has no intention of
28. The Beijing Platform for Action 230(K) states that governments should:
"Support the process initiated by the Commission on the Status of Women with a
view to elaborating a draft optional protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination against Women that could enter into force as soon as
possible on a right of petition procedure ......
29. See G.A. Res. 5414, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/4 (1999)
[hereinafter Optional Protocol].
30. Optional Protocol art. 2, supra note 29, at 3.
31. Optional Protocol art. 8, supra note 29, at 5.
32. See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE
WOMEN'S CONVENTION: ENABLING WOMEN TO CLAIM THEIR RIGHTS AT THE
INTERNATIONAL LEVEL (Jan. 12, 1997), at www.amnesty.org (Al Index: IOR
5 1/04/97) (last visited Feb. 24, 2003).
33. As of May 2002. For a regularly updated list of ratifications, see Division for
the Advancement of Women, "Signatures and Ratifications of the Optional Proto-
col," available at http://www/un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/sigop.htm (last visited
Feb. 24, 2003).
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ratifying the Protocol at the present time.34 In fact, since the UK has
not ratified any of the individual complaints petitions under the UN
treaty system, this appears to be a general policy that is unlikely to
change in the near future.35 It is also unlikely that Hong Kong will
ratify the Optional Protocol at any time soon, as it is now a Special
Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China. Any
decision to ratify the Protocol would have to be approved by the
central government. Thus, our assessment of the prospects for
enforcing CEDAW in the UK and Hong Kong relies primarily upon
the more traditional methods, including the reporting process,
lobbying, NGO shadow reports, and judicial use of CEDAW in
deciding cases.
II. The Implementation of CEDAW in the United Kingdom
A. Introduction
CEDAW was ratified by the UK in 1986. The travaux
preparatoires37 show that the UK government was actively involved in
the drafting process, and proposed alternative drafts to some of the
articles. When it ratified CEDAW, the UK government made a large
number of reservations. However, many of these reservations have
now been withdrawn and the remaining reservations are confined to
nationality, immigration, and social security.38 Thus there should now
be substantial opportunities for CEDAW to affect domestic law and
policy in the UK. Yet interviews with women's organisations reveal
that they are not actively participating in the reporting process, and
that CEDAW is having little effect on domestic policies. Judges also
34. See the response of Lord Scotland to a Parliamentary question asked by Lord
Lester, HANSARD, Mar. 20, 2000, at WA1, and the response of the government to the
Parliamentary questions by Lord Lester, HANSARD, May 2, 2000, at WA50.
35. See INTER DEPARTMENTAL REVIEW OF U.K. POSITION ON INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS (Paper by the Lord Chancellor's Department) (2002),
I.R.I.H.R.I. (02-06) (on file with author).
36. For the background to the UK's ratification of the Convention, see
GEORGINA ASHWORTH, A DIPLOMACY OF THE OPPRESSED: NEW DIRECTIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL FEMINISM (1995).
37. See LARS ADAM REHOF, GUIDE TO THE TRAVAUX PREPARARATOIRES OF THE
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN (1993).
38. There are reservations to Articles 9, 11, 15 and 16. See The Women's. Unit,
Cabinet Office, The Fourth Report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland to the United Nations on the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, at 22-23 (1999).
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have not relied upon CEDAW for guidance when deciding cases.
However, as we note below, the Human Rights Act of 1998 and the
current discussion of the Optional Protocol to CEDAW appear to
have increased NGO interest in international human rights standards.
Thus, there is potential for CEDAW to be relied upon more in the
near future, both as a lobbying tool and as a reference in strategic
litigation.
B. The Reporting Process and the Role of United Kingdom NGOs
Very few UK NGOs have written their own shadow reports to
the CEDAW Committee. Thus, this portion of our study relies
primarily on interviews with NGOs to ascertain their understanding
of CEDAW and the extent to which they have participated indirectly
(for example, by contributing their views to government or quasi-
governmental bodies). The groups interviewed were primarily
women's organisations that are significantly involved in campaigning
on issues of importance to the women's movement. One of the
groups, Charter 88, did not deal directly with women's issues although
it did campaign for better political representation of women. Most of
the groups interviewed were domestic pressure groups, although
certain groups, such as Womankind, Change, and Amnesty
International, have a more international focus. The groups varied in
age, size, and the resources available to them. The interview covered
the work of the pressure group, its use of CEDAW, and the
interviewees' views on the reporting process. Interviewees were also
asked about the utility of the Optional Protocol, whether they
planned to campaign for its ratification by the UK, and what other
steps could be taken to better implement CEDAW. Some
interviewees were very familiar with CEDAW, while others knew
little about it. Those who had more extensive knowledge were
questioned about the nature of CEDAW and whether it would be
more useful to have a more rights-based convention rather than one
based on equality with men.
The UK has submitted four reports to the CEDAW Committee.
Its initial report was submitted in 1987 but was not considered by the
39. The groups interviewed were the Fawcett Society, Rights of Women, Am-
nesty International UK Womankind, Change, Intra African Committee on Harmful
Cultural Practices, Wages for Housework, Women's Environmental Network, Char-
ter 88, National Association of Women's Organisations and the National Council of
Women. Individuals interviewed were the Director of the Women's National Com-
mission and Valerie Evans, ex-Chair of the Women's National Commission.
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CEDAW Committee until 1990. Its second periodic report was
submitted in 1991 and considered in 1993. Its third report was
published in 1993 and the fourth report was published in January
1999. The third and fourth reports were considered together in June
1999. The fourth periodic report was drafted by the government's
Women's Unit. However, the consultation process for the fourth
periodic report was organised by the Women's National Commission'
("WNC"). The WNC is not an NGO. Rather, it describes itself as an
"official independent advisory body" that provides the UK
government with insight into the views of women. The WNC, at the
invitation of the government's Women's Unit, consulted all of its
members and associates on individual articles or on CEDAW
generally. A document was prepared based on this consultation and
sent to the CEDAW Committee's rapporteur for the UK, Judge
Sylvia Cartwright of New Zealand. The WNC commented on
successive drafts of the government report and produced a short
commentary to the final report that was presented to the pre-session
CEDAW working group. The WNC also commented on the
government's answers to the questions posed by the CEDAW expert
committee. The Chair of the WNC also attended the UN hearing and
met with the Committee."
The CEDAW Committee commended the government for its
preparation and stated that it appreciated:
[T]he open manner in which the report was prepared and presented
and, in particular, the breadth of the consultative process with non-
governmental organizations during the preparation of the fourth
periodic report. This enriched the reports and enabled a large
number of women to become informed about the Convention and
the rights protected by it.
42
Although the UK NGOs were consulted by the WNC during the
drafting process, the report was regarded as belonging to the
government and therefore NGOs were not prevented from drafting
their own alternative reports. Nonetheless, very few shadow reports
40. See WOMEN'S NATIONAL COMMISSION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, Submission
to the United Nations' Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women (June 1999). For information on the Women's National Commission, see its
website at http://www.thewnc.org.uk (last visited Mar. 26, 2003).
41. Id. at 38.
42. Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 38, at 289 28, U.N. Doe. A/54/38/Rev.1 (1999) [here-
inafter CEDA W Report].
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were actually produced. A shadow report was produced by the WNC
on the basis of its consultations. NGOs in Northern Ireland also
produced separate shadow reports,43  as did the Women's
International League for Peace and Freedom." However, none of the
other NGOs interviewed for this study drafted their own shadow
report.
It is somewhat surprising that these organisations did not
organise a shadow report of their own. Although the WNC plays a
valuable role in organising the consultation and producing its report,
there is always a danger that a quasi-government organisation like the
WNC may not adequately critique the official government position.
Indeed, such bodies may become a "mechanism to insulate policies
against pressure group activity." 5  One interviewee was not
concerned by this, noting that the WNC was independent of the
government and that some of the more "radical groups" had now
joined the WNC. However, others expressed the view that "the
government sets the agenda" for the WNC, and questioned whether it
could be trusted to be independent. For example, one interviewee
thought that it would be difficult for the WNC to campaign for
ratification of the Optional Protocol in view of the government's
position." Thus, although she commended the WNC for compiling an
alternative report, she thought it would be more useful if the NGOs
themselves had organised a major shadow report. She also
commented that the report was weak in places because the WNC did
not consult all of the key women's groups. Some interviewees
expressed disappointment that the National Association of Women's
43. See NORTHERN IRELAND WOMEN'S EUROPEAN PLATFORM, SUBMISSION TO
THE UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST WOMEN: WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION ON NON-GOVERNMENTAL PUBLIC
BODIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 7 OF THE CONVENTION
(May 1999), available at http://www.nihrc.org/files/submissla.htm (last visited Feb. 24,
2003); THE COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, NORTHERN IRELAND,
Submission to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women (May 1999).
44. See WOMEN's INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM (UK),
CEDAW "Shadow Report" (1999) (on file with author).
45. WYN GRANT, PRESSURE GROUPS AND BRITISH POLITICS (2000).
46. In fact, the WNC has lobbied the government in favour of the ratification of
the Optional Protocol. See UK WOMEN'S NATIONAL COMMISSION, WOMEN 2000:
REPORT FROM THE UK WOMEN'S NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE BEIJING PLATFORM FOR ACTION IN THE UK (1999), available at
http://www.thewnc.org.uk (last visited Feb. 24, 2003) [hereinafter WOMEN 2000
REPORT].
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Organisations ("NAWO") had not organised a shadow report, as this
organisation was clearly independent of government. When
interviewed, however, the Chair of NAWO explained that it lacked
the resources of the WNC.
Some interviewees also noted that the lack of alternative reports
means that women's NGOs with specialised knowledge in particular
areas, such as violence against women or criminal justice, are not
taking the opportunity to convey that knowledge to the CEDAW
Committee. Moreover, the process of composing a shadow report
can help an NGO to set its own political agenda. One interviewee
noted that UK women's groups could learn from NGOs in other
countries in this respect, as a strong NGO shadow report could be a
useful lobby tool "well beyond the period of reporting." Moreover,
individual NGO shadow reports can reach particular sectors of the
community that have a special interest in the work of that group,
thereby increasing public awareness of CEDAW.
Interviewees commented that the failure of women's groups to
co-ordinate one or more shadow reports separately from the WNC
was partly the result of the fragmented nature of the women's
movement in the UK. One activist stated, "There are lots of women's
organisations but no cohesion. We don't tend to come together over
common causes. That is a challenge in itself." This view is consistent
with much of the literature, which highlights the diversity of the UK
women's movement, particularly in the past two decades. In 1978, the
movement experienced a split over the issue of whether male violence
was an inherent aspect of masculinity, and there has been no real
attempt to re-establish a single network. The women's movement has
been described as a "dispersed collection of groups, campaigns and
political tendencies with no single ideology."'" Moreover, since many
of these groups are preoccupied with service provision, they only
come together for campaigns on particular issues. This is not to
underestimate the impact of the women's movement on politics,
which often manifests itself through political parties and trade
unions.49 It simply acknowledges that there is no single umbrella
47. David Boater, The Feminist Challenge (1984) (quoted in Joyce Glee, Move-
ment Strategies: Inside or Outside The System: Feminism in Britain: Politics Without
Power?), in DRUDE DAHLERUP, THE NEW WOMEN'S MOVEMENT: FEMINISM AND
POLITICAL POWER IN EUROPE AND THE USA 109 (1986).
48. See Hannana Siddiqui, Black Women's Activism: Coming of Age, 64 FEMINIST
REV. 83 (Spring 2000).
49. For a discussion of the impact of the women's movement on British politics,
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organisation capable of mobilising the diverse interests that are
working on women's concerns.
The interviews also indicate that many UK women's
organisations lack knowledge about CEDAW and do not understand
how it may be useful. This raises the question of whether enough is
being done to publicise CEDAW, which is one of the obligations of a
State Party. In theory, the UK government carries out this obligation
through the WNC. Although the WNC has often been criticised for
representing too narrow a range of women, it has recently made a
greater effort to be inclusive and has opened its membership to all
women's groups. The impact of this can be seen in the WNC's report
for the Beijing Plus Five conference in 2000, which reflects an
increase in the number and diversity of the groups consulted."'
Nonetheless, at least three interviewees argued that they still found it
difficult to become involved in the organisation. This is particularly
worrying with regard to smaller organisations that do not have staff
with knowledge of international treaties and thus rely on the WNC
for information and training on CEDAW.
The interviews also indicate that many women's groups in the
UK have not developed a "rights based" approach and do not link the
issues on which they campaign with the broader concept of human
rights. While some of the interviewees argued that they simply lacked
the resources and expertise to participate in the CEDAW
enforcement process, others expressed doubt about the value of the
convention within the domestic sphere. This leads to the next issue,
which is the extent to which CEDAW and the Concluding Comments
of the CEDAW Committee can be fed into domestic policy debates
in the UK.
C. The Impact of CEDA W on Public Policy in the United Kingdom
Many interviewees questioned the ability of CEDAW to have
any impact on government policies in the UK, noting that it would
only be useful in establishing principles and not fine details. One
interviewee commented, "If we want political leverage we would use
women's votes. If we mention the Women's Convention, the
government is likely to say that its record is so much better than many
other countries." Some groups also argued that after eighteen years
see JONI LOVENDUSKI & VICKY RANDALL, CONTEMPORARY FEMINIST POLITICS:
WOMEN AND POWER IN BRITAIN (1995).
50. WOMEN 2000 REPORT, supra note 46.
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of Conservative government and since the change of government in
June 1997, when New Labour came to power, women's issues were at
least on the agenda, and references to CEDAW would not add much
to the government's approach. Indeed, McRobbie argues that "the
situation of women in contemporary Britain is at the heart of the
present government's key concerns."'" For example, she notes that
the government is already concerned with such issues as single
parents, welfare to work, the provision of childcare, and teenage
pregnancy.
Several interviewees felt that that CEDAW would not be a
useful lobbying tool in any event because the political culture in the
UK is too insular. One interviewee complained that CEDAW is
regarded as being "for foreign consumption only," and that a "British
is best" mentality makes politicians reluctant to look at what other
societies are doing. Some women commented that UK women's
organisations are also "obsessively national" and fail to see the
purpose of taking a more international approach.
The observations of these interviewees are understandable in
view of the approach taken by the UK government. CEDAW is
rarely referred to by the British government within the domestic
sphere, and appears to be having almost no impact upon public
policy. For example, the government does not refer to CEDAW
when introducing legislation or proposing new policies. There is also
no Parliamentary Committee that studies the government's periodic
reports. From the point of view of the government, the Sex
Discrimination Act 1975 and other domestic legislation satisfy its
obligations, and it does not see any particular need to further
implement CEDAW through domestic policies.
This approach was criticised by the CEDAW Committee, which
noted that the British government's answers to questions indicate that
the government considers its obligations under CEDAW to be less
enforceable than obligations under the European Convention of
Human Rights. The tendency of the government to elevate the
European Convention above CEDAW is problematic because the
European Convention does not contain an independent right to
equality, rather, it only guarantees equality in the enjoyment of other
rights stated in the European Convention. These rights are far more
limited than those provided in CEDAW. As the CEDAW
51. Angela McRobbie, Feminism and the Third Way, 64 FEMINIST REV. 97, 105
(Spring 2000).
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Committee noted in its Concluding Comments:
[T]he European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms does not provide for the full range of women's human
rights incorporated in the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women. In particular, the
European Convention does not provide for the rights to equality in
Article 2 of the Convention. Nor does it contain a positive
obligation for governments to eliminate indirect discrimination as
defined in Article I of the Convention or provide for temporary
special measures as set out in article 4.1 of the Convention."
It is also noteworthy that the documents relating to CEDAW
rarely make their way into the UK's domestic political process. After
the CEDAW Committee had completed its last review of the
government report, there was no formal or public debate in the UK
on the Concluding Comments produced by the Committee. This is
despite the fact that the Committee stated that there should be
widespread dissemination of its comments "in order to make the
people of the United Kingdom, and particularly government
administrators and politicians, aware of the steps that have been
taken to ensure de jure and de facto equality for women and the
further steps that are required in that regard."53
The Committee also stated that its recommendations should be
distributed to human rights and women's organisations. If this were
done it might help women's groups to see the potential value of the
CEDAW and encourage them to make greater use of the Concluding
Comments in their campaigns on particular issues.
It would also be useful if the government's report and the
Concluding Comments could be tabled before Parliament for debate
in either house or if it was submitted to a Parliamentary Committee
for discussion. Interestingly, a Human Rights Joint Committee
("HRJC") was recently established in Parliament to consider matters
relating to human rights in the UK, particularly in relation to the
Human Rights Act of 1998. The HRJC could also consider the
CEDAW Committee's Concluding Comments and those of the other
core international human rights treaties. Alternatively, there could
be a Parliamentary Committee on Equality which could consider the
Concluding Comments, as well as the Beijing Platform for Action and
other issues relating to implementation of CEDAW. One
52. CEDAW Report, supra note 42, 300.
53. CEDAW Report, supra note 42, JI 318.
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encouraging sign is that the WNC has supported this approach,
suggesting that such a committee could "address women's concerns to
see what is being achieved ... within government ... and give a focus
on the wide range of equality work on women. ... " Another way of
encouraging compliance would be to adopt a system of pre-legislative
scrutiny, which would require the minister or other person
introducing the bill to certify that the bill complies with CEDAW
D. Judicial Use of CEDA W in the United Kingdom
Whenever the impact of CEDAW is examined in a particular
jurisdiction, the two key questions are whether the judiciary is aware of
the Convention, and if so, whether the judiciary is willing to enforce it.
Bayefsky maintains that: "Domestic courts can serve as a missing link
between promulgation and realisation of international human rights
norms to the benefit of both international and domestic law.
56
Unfortunately, as the recently completed First CEDAW Impact Study
indicates, judges frequently fail to apply CEDAW to questions
involving women's rights. 7
This is equally true in the UK, where it is almost impossible to
locate judicial references to CEDAW. One reason for its under-use is
that CEDAW is not incorporated into UK domestic law, and its legal
effect is therefore limited. In accordance with the doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty, treaties are not directly enforceable in the
UK courts unless they have been expressly incorporated into
domestic law.58 However, as noted later in this section, there is a
statutory presumption that Parliament intends to comply with its
international obligations unless otherwise stated.59 Thus, the UK
54. See WOMEN 2000 REPORT, supra note 46, at 61.
55. For a discussion of the issue of pre-legislative scrutiny of human rights, see
David Kinley, Parliamentary Scrutiny of Human Rights: A Duty Neglected?, in
PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH BILLS OF RIGHTS: COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES 158-184 (Phillip Alston ed., 1999).
56. Anne F. Bayefsky, General Approaches to Domestic Application of Interna-
tional Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES 351-374 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994).
57. The First CEDAW Impact Study: Final Report (Centre for Feminist Research
and The International Women's Rights Project 2000), available at
http://www.yorku.ca/iwrp/CEDAW%201mpact%20Study.htm (last visited Feb. 24,
2003) [hereinafter First CEDAW Impact Study]. Of special interest is the Country Re-
port on Nepal by Sapana Pradhan Malla.
58. Mortensen v. Peters, 14 Scottish Law Times 227, 100, High Court of Justiciary
(1906).
59. R v. Chief Immigration Officer Heathrow Airport, ex parte Salamat Bibi, 3
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courts could look to CEDAW for guidance in interpreting domestic
legislation if they were inclined to do so. It may be that UK judges
are not adequately informed about CEDAW, as it does not attract
nearly as much interest and publicity as the European Convention on
Human Rights ("ECHR"). (Although the ECHR was also
unincorporated until the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998, it
did provide for a right of individual petition and therefore gave rise to
a body of case law decided by the European Court of Human Rights.)
The landmark case of Islam v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department," decided by the House of Lords in 1999, is an
exceptional case in that it contains a reference to CEDAW, albeit a
quite limited one. In this case, the House of Lords had to decide
whether two women asylum seekers could claim refugee status in the
UK within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention"t
and the Protocol on the Status of Refugees.62 The women had
separated from their husbands after suffering domestic violence, and
feared persecution if they were returned to Pakistan. In particular,
they argued that they could, upon their return, suffer death by stoning
in accordance with Pakistan's Sharia law. It was accepted that the
women had a well-founded fear of persecution if returned, and would
not receive protection from the Pakistani authorities. Thus the case
largely turned on the question of whether they would suffer
persecution because they were part of a particular social group.
The House of Lords decided that the Pakistani women were part
of a "particular social group," because (1) they were discriminated
against as a group, (2) they were denied their fundamental human
rights, and (3) the Pakistani authorities offered them no protection
from violent abuse.63 Lord Hoffman noted that discrimination against
women is contrary to international human rights standards, and that
Pakistan had actually ratified CEDAW in 1996. Unfortunately, Lord
Hoffman did not then proceed to discuss the fact that since the UK
has also ratified CEDAW, the courts should interpret UK refugee
law in accordance with the principles of non-discrimination. Article 2
of CEDAW provides that a State Party undertakes to "establish legal
protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with men and- to
All E.R. 843 (C.A. 1976).
60. Islam v. Secretary for State for the Home Department Immigration Appeal
Tribunal and Another, 2 A.C. 629, 655 (1999).
61. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
62. Protocol on the Status of Refugee, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 8791.
63. Islam, supra note 60, at 652-655.
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ensure through competent national tribunals and other public
institutions the effective protection of women." If an asylum law
appears to be gender-neutral but really takes no account of women's
experience of persecution, then the State Party would arguably be in
breach of its obligations under CEDAW. Thus, the House of Lords
could have applied the presumption that Parliament intended to
comply with its international obligations unless otherwise stated. 4
Through this approach, the House of Lords could have adopted an
interpretation of the asylum law that would not discriminate against
women. Unfortunately, the House of Lords did not take this
opportunity to hold that CEDAW could be relied upon in
interpreting domestic law.
CEDAW was also ignored in the recent landmark case of R v.
A,65 where the House of Lords considered the compatibility of the
rape shield laws with the European Convention on Human Rights.
Discussion of CEDAW in the context of this important issue of
women's human rights could have led the House of Lords to
underline the fact that violence against women is a form of
discrimination, and that the UK has an obligation under Article 2(C)
of CEDAW to "adopt appropriate legislative and other measures,
including sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination
against women."
Byrnes has studied several examples in which courts in other
commonwealth jurisdictions have referred to CEDAW. He argues
that the extent to which unincorporated conventions are used
depends largely upon judicial attitudes. While some judges may have
reservations about using unincorporated treaties as an aid to
interpretation, "a judiciary which is prepared to be open to
international influences and to draw on international jurisprudence
has some scope for doing so in most common law systems., 66 For
example, in R v. Ewanchuk, a criminal law case involving sexual
assault, the Canadian Supreme Court rejected a defence of "implied
64. R v. Chief Immigration Officer Heathrow Airport, ex parte Salamat Bibi, 3
All E.R. 843 (C.A. 1976).
65. Regina v. A, (2001) U.K. H.L. 25, 52, available at
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/ld200001/ldjudgmt/jd010517/regina-l.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2003).
66. See Andrew Byrnes, Human Rights Instruments Relating Specifically to
Women, with Particular Emphasis on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, in ADVANCING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN:
USING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS IN DOMESTIC LITIGATION 37-57
(Andrew Byrnes et al. eds., 1997).
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consent., 67  The judgments of Judge L'Heureux-Dube and Judge
Gonthier referred to CEDAW and General Recommendation 19 of
the CEDAW Committee as authority for the principles that the
definition of discrimination includes gender-based violence, and that
state parties have an obligation to ensure that laws against sexual
assault give adequate protection to women and respect their integrity
and dignity. 6 Thus, the international materials assisted the judges in
deciding that sexual violence is a denial of gender equality.6 This is
precisely the approach that could have been taken by the House of
Lords in R v. A.7'
Of course, the extent to which courts look to international
jurisprudence is also influenced by the submissions of the lawyers
who appear before them. In particular, the reference to CEDAW in
R v. Ewanchuk was probably facilitated by the interventions of
Canadian women's groups. These groups presented a feminist
analysis to the court, including references to the relevant
international obligations.' In contrast, UK NGOs traditionally have
not made extensive use of strategic litigation.
However, they have recently made more of an attempt to do so.
For example, there was an intervention by several women's
organisations in the case of R v. A, which was referred to in the
judgement of Lord Hope." Justice for Women also made an attempt
to seek judicial review of the Home Secretary's decision to admit the
boxer Mike Tyson to the UK. Although this attempt failed, it
attracted substantial publicity in the UK and may encourage other
women's groups to apply to intervene in future cases.73 In general, it
appears that the introduction of the Human Rights Act of 1998 has
67. R v. Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330.
68. Id. T 7l.
69. See Catherine Fraser, R v Ewanchuck: A Case Study on the Meaning of Con-
sent in Cases of Sexual Violence Against Women, in BRINGING INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW HOME: JUDICIAL COLLOQUIUM ON THE DOMESTIC
APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
WOMEN AND THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 163-167 (2000).
70. Regina, supra note 65.
71. The Women's Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF) and the Disabled
Women's Network of Canada (DAWN Canada) were intervenors in the case.
72. Regina, supra note 65, 54. Lord Hope referred to the joint written inter-
vention of the Rape Crisis Federation of England and Wales, the Campaign to End
Rape, the Child and Woman Abuse Studies Unit and Justice for Women.
73. See Rape Crisis Centre Cannot Challenge Leave to Enter, TIMES (London),
July 18, 2000; Adrian Lee et al., Tyson Prays as Women Lose Fight in Court, TIMES
(London), Jan. 18, 2000, at 5.
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increased NGO interest in strategic litigation, despite the narrow
rules of standing74 and the difficulties third parties face in intervening
in cases." Francesca Klug has described this as a new zeitgeist, which
has led many NGOs to re-brand themselves as human rights groups."
Perhaps this atmosphere will provide more opportunities for lawyers
to refer judges to CEDAW, and may gradually make the courts more
mindful of CEDAW and its place in the British legal system.
The next section of the article draws comparisons with Hong
Kong, where CEDAW has been in force for a shorter period of time
but is arguably having more impact upon law and policy as they affect
women's rights.
III. The Implementation of CEDAW in Hong Kong
A. Introduction
CEDAW was not extended to Hong Kong until 1996, a decade
after the UK ratified it. In addition, Hong Kong has only reported once
to the CEDAW Committee.77 Many NGO representatives have
complained in interviews and in public forums that the Hong Kong
government still does not genuinely embrace CEDAW. However, the
treaty has already had some impact upon public policy, and the judiciary
has already relied on CEDAW in a recent action for judicial review as a
tool for interpreting the local Sex Discrimination Ordinance. In this
section, we analyse these developments and the role played by women's
NGOs, both in the campaign for CEDAW's extension to Hong Kong
and in the CEDAW enforcement process.
B. The Campaign for CEDA W in Hong Kong
Unlike women in the UK, the Hong Kong women's movement had
74. Under section 7(1)(3) of the Human Rights Act of 1998, those bringing pro-
ceedings against a public authority must be victims. The wider formulation of suffi-
cient interest was rejected.
75. The government rejected suggestions that procedural rules be included
whereby interested organisations could intervene during litigation. See AILEEN
MCCOLGAN, WOMEN UNDER THE LAW: THE FALSE PROMISE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 268-
269 (2000).
76. FRANCESCA KLUG, VALUES FOR A GODLESS AGE: THE STORY OF THE
UNITED KINGDOM'S NEW BILL OF RIGHTS 6 (2000).
77. Initial Report on the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region under Article 18
of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(Nov. 9, 1998), available at www.hku.hk/ccpl/cedaw/ccplcedawsubmission.html (last
visited Feb. 24, 2003) [hereinafter Initial Report].
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to lobby for many years before CEDAW was extended to Hong Kong.
This was unusual, since the normal practice of the British government
was to include its dependent territories when it ratified an international
human rights treaty.9  However, when the United Kingdom ratified
CEDAW in 1986, the Hong Kong government expressly requested that
it not be applied to Hong Kong. On several occasions after the UK's
ratification, local women's groups asked the Hong Kong government to
state its position on the convention. The government would only say
that CEDAW was under consideration, and that it needed more time to
consider the implications that it would have for existing legislation and
policies.79 In fact, the Hong Kong government probably understood the
implications quite well, and knew that it was not ready to comply with
CEDAW. In the mid-1980s, there was no right to equality in the
colonial constitution and no law prohibiting discrimination or sexual
harassment. Although international human rights conventions that
applied to Hong Kong did assert a general right to equality,0 they were
not yet incorporated into any domestic legislation and were largely
ignored. As a result, sex discrimination was openly practised and
accepted as the norm.
For example, women were legally barred from inheriting much of
the land in the New Territories until 1994. In about one-third of New
Territories villages they were also barred from voting for or standing for
election for village representative. There were also numerous
discriminatory "protective regulations" and virtually every newspaper
contained sex specific job advertisements seeking, for example, "male
engineers" and "female clerks.""'
78. This is how the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the International Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination all came to apply to
the "crown colony" of Hong Kong. See ANDREW BYRNES & JOHANNES CHAN, PUBLIC
LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A HONG KONG SOURCEBOOK 298 (1993).
79. See, e.g., Third Periodic Report by Hong Kong under Article 40 of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 26 (Oct. 1989). See also Third Periodic
Report by Hong Kong under Article 40 of the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights: An Update 89 (Mar. 1991), available at
www.hku.hk/law/conlaawhk/sourcebook/human%20rights/40012.htm (last visited Feb.
24,2003) [hereinafter Third Periodic Report by Hong Kong: An Update].
80. For a discussion of the equality provisions of these conventions, see Andrew
Byrnes, Equality and Non-Discrimination, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN HONG KONG (Ray-
mond Wacks ed., 1992).
81. For discussion of these and other examples of discrimination and the lack of
anti-discrimination law at that time, see Carole J. Petersen, Equality as a Human Right.
The Development of Anti-Discrimination Law in Hong Kong, 34 COLUM. J. OF
TRANSNAT'L L. 335, 338-348 (1996), and Harriet Samuels, Women and the Law in
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In lobbying for CEDAW and a sex discrimination law, women's
organisations frequently pointed out that the government was failing to
give Hong Kong women the level of protection that British women
enjoyed. However, the colonial government justified the differential
standards on two grounds: (1) it had an obligation to respect traditional
Chinese customs; and (2) CEDAW and anti-discrimination legislation
would interfere with the laissez-faire economic policies that were
considered essential to Hong Kong's economic development. Since the
government and legislature were entirely appointed there was little that
the women's movement could do to pressure the government to change
its position.
Had it not been for the "transition period" prior to 1997, CEDAW
might still be missing from Hong Kong's legal system. However, in the
last years of British rule, Hong Kong underwent enormous legal and
political development." Although these changes started in 1984,
immediately after the signing of the Joint Declaration (the treaty by
which the British government agreed to return Hong Kong to China in
1997), they did not reach their peak until the years following June 4,
1989. Approximately one million people (about twenty percent of
Hong Kong's population) marched in the streets to protest the
Tianamen Square massacre, and demands for democracy and legal
protection of human rights in Hong Kong dramatically increased.
In an effort to rebuild confidence, the Hong Kong government
announced a package of proposals, including a domestic Bill of Rights
Ordinance ("Bill of Rights"). The draft Bill of Rights was essentially
copied from the ICCPR, which includes the right to equality and non-
discrimination. Although the Bill of Rights itself was not a superior law,
it had the effect of repealing prior inconsistent laws, and the legislature
was prohibited from enacting subsequent laws that were inconsistent
with the ICCPR (by virtue of a simultaneous amendment to the colonial
constitution, the Letters Patent). Several women's organisations
participated in the public consultation on the draft Bill of Rights, hoping
to obtain more detailed language on the right to equality and to use the
Bill as a weapon against sex discrimination. Unfortunately, as a result
of extensive lobbying by the business community, Section 7 of the Bill
of Rights was amended shortly before its enactment, so as to limit its
Hong Kong: A Feminist Analysis, in HONG KONG, CHINA AND 1997: ESSAYS IN LEGAL
THEORY (Raymond Wacks ed., 1993).
82. This section briefly summarizes those developments. For a more complete
analysis, see Petersen, supra note 81.
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application to the government and public bodies. The amendment
significantly reduced the extent to which women could use the Bill of
Rights to challenge discriminatory practices in the private sector.
Indeed, the Court of Appeal later interpreted Section 7 as
preventing a party from using the Bill of Rights even to challenge
discriminatory laws that affected private rights.3 As a result of this
decision (and the high. cost of litigating in Hong Kong), the Bill of
Rights ultimately had little direct impact on discrimination in Hong
Kong. Nonetheless, its enactment was a significant step, as it was the
first law in Hong Kong to publicly recognise a right to equality.
Moreover, since the Bill of Rights incorporated the ICCPR into
domestic law, it also helped to educate women's groups and other
NGOs about the ICCPR and the ways in which it might be used to
influence public policy. Even while the proposed Bill of Rights was
being considered by the legislature, NGOs became more interested in
writing shadow reports to the United Nations Human Rights
Committee, commenting upon the Hong Kong government's reports
under the ICCPR.84 The reports by women's NGOs cited examples of
inequality in Hong Kong society, complained about the lack of anti-
discrimination legislation, and called for CEDAW to be extended to
Hong Kong." NGOs also used the debate on the proposed Bill of
Rights to educate and lobby members of the Legislative Council. The
first direct elections to the legislature (for a limited number of seats)
were held in 1991, giving women the opportunity to ask candidates to
state their positions on gender issues. Recognising the importance of
the women's vote, several legislators became strong supporters of the
equality movement. For example, Emily Lau, one of the first group of
directly elected legislators, formed an Ad Hoc Group in the Legislative
Council to study women's issues. In December 1992, she agreed to
assist the campaign for CEDAW by introducing the following motion
for debate in the Legislative Council:
[T]his Council calls upon the Administration to support the
extension to Hong Kong of the United Nations Convention on the
83. Tam Hing-yee v. WuTai-wai, H.K. P.L.R. 261 (1991).
84. For discussion of how Hong Kong NGOs participated in the reporting process
under several international human rights treaties, see Andrew Bymes, Uses and Abuses
of the Treaty Reporting Procedure: Hong Kong Between Two Systems, in THE FUTURE
OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING, supra note 24, at 291-300.
85. Report of the Hong Kong Council of Women on the Third Periodic Report
by Hong Kong Under Article 40 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (1991).
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Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women and to
request the British Government to take the necessary action to so
extend the Convention forthwith.
The speeches made during the debate on Lau's motion revealed
the impact that limited democracy had had upon the legislature. Many
legislators spoke in favour of the motion, citing evidence of sex
discrimination that had been submitted to them by women's groups. In
the end, although the government strongly opposed the motion, all
members present voted in favour of it (except for the three government
ex officio representatives, who chose to abstain in the face of certain
defeat).86
The vote was an important victory for the women's movement, and
it left the government in a difficult position. Although it was not legally
obligated to implement a motion passed by the Legislative Council, it
also could not simply ignore the views of the only arguably
representative body, the partly elected legislature. Instead, the
government bought some additional time by insisting that applying
CEDAW to Hong Kong would represent such a significant shift in
policy that it could not be done without first consulting the public
directly. It thus announced that it would conduct its first formal public
consultation on the issue of gender equality, and issued the Green Paper
on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men. 7 The government did its
best to downplay the examples of sex discrimination in the consultative
document, but this only made women activists more determined to
articulate their demands. It also made other groups more supportive.
In addition to women's organisations, numerous other NGOs and
individuals made submissions." At the end of the five-month
consultation period, the Secretary for Home Affairs was forced to
concede that the majority of responses supported the extension of
CEDAW to Hong Kong and the enactment of a law prohibiting sex
discrimination.89
At this point, the debate on whether CEDAW should be applied to
Hong Kong essentially ended. The key questions became: (1) how long
86. See Hong Kong Legislative Council Official Record of Proceedings at 1451 (Dec.
16, 1992) (on file with author).
87. HONG KONG GOVERNMENT, GREEN PAPER ON EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR
WOMEN AND MEN (1993) (on file with author).
88. HONG KONG GOVERNMENT, GREEN PAPER ON EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR
WOMEN AND MEN: COMPENDIUM OF SUBMISSIONS (May 1994) (on file with author).
89. S. Y. Yu, U.N. Convention to Be Adopted, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 31,
1993, at 2.
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would it take; (2) what reservations would be included; and (3) what
sort of domestic legislation would be enacted to comply with it? To
some extent the first two issues were affected by the need to negotiate
with China in order for the treaty to apply to Hong Kong beyond 1997.
However, this was not a major stumbling block since China itself had
already ratified CEDAW (although it certainly had not implemented it
in the way that women's organisations wanted to see it implemented in
Hong Kong).
It was the third issue-the need for domestic sex discrimination
legislation-that had the potential to delay the extension of CEDAW.
Indeed, under the old colonial order, the government might well have
pondered that question for at least ten years. It could have done so
because all new legislation was traditionally drafted by the government.
The appointed legislators were only part-time legislators, who attended
to their other professions most of the time and never drafted
substantive legislation. However, in the 1990s, certain legislators
became more assertive, and the government found that it was no longer
entirely in charge of the legislative timetable. During the consultation
exercise on CEDAW, one independent legislator, Anna Wu, had
started to draft her own Equal Opportunities Bill ("EOB").90 Based
upon Western Australian legislation, the EOB sought to prohibit
discrimination on a wide range of grounds including sex, marital status,
pregnancy, family responsibility, disability, sexuality, race, age, and
political and religious conviction. Wu was the first legislator to draft a
bill covering an entire new area of law. The government initially
ignored her bill, dismissing it as too radical to be taken seriously.
However, after Wu distributed her draft bill for public comment, the
Democratic Party (which held the largest number of directly elected
seats in the legislature) and a number of independent legislators
pledged to support her bill. She then formally introduced her bill, in
July 1994, and a Bills Committee began to study it.
At this point the government realised that it had to act quickly.
Since the Legislative Council was due to become fully elected in 1995,
even pro-business legislators would find it difficult to oppose Wu's
bill-unless they could be presented with a more conservative
alternative. The government thus announced that it would introduce its
own Sex Discrimination Bill and Disability Discrimination Bill. These
two areas of discrimination had attracted the most support, and the
90. Equal Opportunities Bill (1994), HONG KONG Gov'T GAZETTE, Legal Supple-
ment No. 3, July 1, 1994, at C991-C1275.
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government hoped that by promising to legislate against them it could
prevent Wu's broader bill from being enacted. To an extent, this
strategy worked for the government-the EOB was defeated and the
other grounds of discrimination covered in it, such as race, age, and
sexuality, still have not been legislated against.9 However, Wu did
succeed in getting certain amendments added to the government's
original bill, in order to make it more compliant with CEDAW. For
example, Wu persuaded the government to add an exemption for
voluntary special measures (affirmative action),92 which is provided for
in Article 4 of CEDAW. The government also agreed to widen the
scope of the prohibition on pregnancy discrimination (in the original bill
it was limited to the field of employment) and to expressly prohibit
student-to-student sexual harassment.93  However, many of Wu's
proposed amendments were strongly opposed by the government, and
only a few of these contested amendments were eventually enacted by
the legislature.94 The Governor also used his constitutional powers to
prevent Wu from introducing some of her amendments, including one
that would have expressly included the implementation of CEDAW
and other international conventions relating to discrimination within the
powers of the Equal Opportunities Commission.95
91. The only exception is that the Family Status Discrimination Bill was enacted in
June 1997, as well as a bill amending the Sex Discrimination Ordinance and Disability
Discrimination Ordinance. For discussion of the impact of these amendments and the
difficulties in enacting broader anti-discrimination laws in post-1997 Hong Kong, see
Carole J. Petersen, Equal Opportunities: A New Field of Law for Hong Kong, in HONG
KONG's NEW LEGAL ORDER (Raymond Wacks ed., 1999).
92. The exemption now appears in Section 48 of the Sex Discrimination Ordi-
nance.
93. See Sex Discrimination Ordinance, section 39(3). This provision has been
applied in the case of Yuen Sha Sha v. Tse Chi Pan, 1 H.K.C. 731 (1999), in which a
female university student was awarded damages after discovering that a male student
had been secretly filming her in her dormitory room. For a discussion of the case
(and a critique of the rather low damages awarded), see Carole J. Petersen, Imple-
menting Equality: An Analysis of Two Recent Decisions Under Hong Kong's Anti-
Discrimination Laws, 29 H.K. L.J. 178 (1999).
94. The legislature did adopt a few important amendments over the govern-
ment's objection, including one that applied the new law to elections for village rep-
resentative in the New Territories region of Hong Kong (which was applied in the
case of Secretary for Justice & Others v. Chan Wah & Others, 4 H.K.C. 428 (2000)).
For a more detailed discussion of the amendments proposed by Wu and the Bills
Committee, see Petersen, supra note 81, at 380-383.
95. Clause XXIV(2)(c) of the Hong Kong Royal Instructions (part of Hong
Kong's colonial constitution) provided that a member of the Legislative Council must
obtain permission from the Governor in order to introduce any bill or amendment
that will place a charge upon the public revenue. With respect to this proposed
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The Sex Discrimination Ordinance was thus enacted in the summer
of 1995 and was brought into force in 1996. The Equal Opportunities
Commission was established in May 1996 to assist with enforcement of
the two new laws. CEDAW was then finally extended to Hong Kong
with the consent of both the British and Chinese governments. China
agreed that CEDAW would continue to apply to Hong Kong after 1997
and that it would report on behalf of Hong Kong to the CEDAW
Committee. A number of reservations were entered, including one for
the controversial "Small House Policy." This is a government policy
that allows indigenous male residents of the New Territories to build a
house, often on government land at a concessionary rate. The value of
these properties has soared in the past twenty years. The government is
in a very difficult position because it does not have enough land to
extend the policy to women and thus would probably have to abolish it
if the reservation in CEDAW were removed. 96 As a result, its approach
to the issue has been to continually claim that the policy is under review,
17but never to announce any conclusions arising from that review.
Women had also hoped that a Women's Commission would be
created, one that could serve as the "national machinery" for the
implementation of CEDAW in Hong Kong. Although the Equal
Opportunities Commission was welcomed by the women's movement,
it did not fully satisfy their desire for a Women's Commission. The
Equal Opportunities Commission is charged with enforcing the Sex
Discrimination Ordinance (as well as the disability legislation), but it
has almost no influence over government policy making. Thus, the
need for a local enforcement machinery for CEDAW would continue to
amendment, the government argued that it would give the Equal Opportunities
Commission additional responsibilities and therefore place a charge on public reve-
nue. Anna Wu disputed this, arguing that the amendment did not require additional
funding as it would simply give the Commission greater flexibility in deciding how to
spend its budget. However, the President of the Legislative Council decided that this
amendment would have a charging effect and could not be moved without the Gov-
ernor's permission, which was not given. For further discussion of how this power
was used to prevent Wu from introducing other amendments (as well as her own
Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission Bill), see Petersen, supra note
81.
96. The government also inserted an exemption for the small house policy in the Sex
Discrimination Bill and efforts to remove it by legislators Anna Wu in 1995 and Chris-
tine Loh in 1997 have thus far failed.
97. For example, in its Initial Report to the CEDAW Committee the Hong Kong
government stated that it hoped to complete its review by 1998, but no results have
been announced to the public as of 2002. Initial Report, supra note 77, 173. For ad-
ditional information on the Small House Policy, see Petersen, supra note 81, at 343-
344.
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be a rallying point for women's organisations as they prepared for Hong
Kong's Initial Report under Article 18 to the CEDAW Committee.
C. The Role of Hong Kong NGOs in the CEDA W Reporting Process
Similar to the UK, the women's movement in Hong Kong is
extremely diverse.98 Most women's groups now operate in Cantonese,
the version of Chinese that is spoken by the majority of Hong Kong
people. However, there are still a number of groups that operate in
English because they include expatriate members and/or because they
are professionally oriented. In the colonial period, these English-
speaking groups were quite visible because the language of the
government and the legislature was still primarily English. This
changed during the transition period leading up to 1997, and most
NGO lobbying of the Hong Kong government now occurs in
Cantonese. However, certain English-speaking groups, such as the
Association of Business and Professional Women and Women in
Publishing, do still participate in the lobbying process. There are also
a number of organisations that operate primarily in Cantonese but
can also lobby in English. For example, the Association for the
Advancement of Feminism, known as AAF, maintains a partly
bilingual web-page and produces documents in both languages."
Similarly, the Hong Kong Federation of Women's Centres"° (which
provides a significant array of services for women, including a legal
clinic) produces a certain amount of literature in English and has
English-speaking staff, although it operates primarily in Cantonese.
Of course, it is easier for the bilingual groups to participate in the
CEDAW process. Although the government has distributed CEDAW
and related materials in Chinese as well as English, much of the
government's publicity on it is quite simplistic and says very little about
the potential of CEDAW. In contrast, the bilingual groups can access a
much broader range of information on CEDAW. These.groups have
often formed coalitions with groups that are not bilingual, allowing a
broader range of groups to produce lobbying, documents in both
98. See Catherine W. Ng & Evelyn G.H. Ng, The Concept of State Feminism and
the Case for Hong Kong, 8 ASIAN J. OF WOMEN'S STUDIES 7, 20-22; Lai et al.,
Women's Concern Groups in Hong Kong, in ENGENDERING HONG KONG SOCIETY: A
GENDER PERSPECTIVE OF WOMEN'S STUD. (F. M. Cheung ed., 1997).
99. The webpage of AAF can be found at http://www.aaf.org.hk/htm (last visited
Nov. 5, 2002).
100. The webpage of the Hong Kong Federation of Women's Centres can be
found at http://www.womencentre.org.hk/main-acti.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2002).
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languages. Many issue-specific groups (such as Harmony House,
which operates a shelter for victims of domestic violence, the Hong
Kong Association for the Survivors of Women Abuse, and the Family
Planning Association) have also joined these coalitions. This allows
groups with expertise in particular areas to feed their knowledge into
the broader campaign for women's equality.
However, Hong Kong women's groups do often differ with
respect to their political positions. Some groups are strongly
associated with the general human rights and pro-democracy
movements in Hong Kong. In contrast, other groups are considered
much more conservative and not particularly feminist. The
Federation of Hong Kong Women (which is not to be confused with
the Hong Kong Federation of Women's Centre's, mentioned above)
is a very prominent conservative group and is widely viewed as a
"pro-China" organisation."' This group has actually taken some
positions that undermined women's equality (such as proposing an
amendment to the Sex Discrimination Ordinance capping damages at
a very low amount) and thus it has attracted some hostility from the
more feminist organisations. 2 Hong Kong women's groups have also
differed on the issue of sexuality. While some groups support equal
rights for lesbians and gays, others declined to endorse legislation that
would have prohibited discrimination on the ground of sexuality.' 3
However, the lesbian-rights group Queer Sisters has been included in
recent coalitions that are lobbying on women's rights generally.
It should also be noted that there are a number of NGOs that
represent foreign domestic helpers. These groups are slowly
101. See the website of the Hong Kong Federation of Women, at
http://www/hkfw.org.htm, which lists, as its objectives "to support the Sino-British
Joint Declaration and the Basic Law ... and help to maintain the prosperity and sta-
bility of Hong Kong."
102. The amendment, which capped damages at HK $150,000 (about US $20,000),
was proposed by Mrs. Peggy Lam, one of the founding members of the Federation of
Women who was also a member of the Legislative Council at that time. The
amendment was not supported by the Bills Committee but received significant sup-
port from the other pro-business legislators and was enacted. Fortunately, the cap
was repealed in June 1997 by a private members' bill proposed by Christine Loh, a
directly elected legislator at that time. For a discussion of the cap on damages and
the legislation that removed it, see Carole J. Petersen, Hong Kong's First Anti-
Discrimination Laws and Their Potential Impact Upon Employment, 27 H.K. L.J. 324,
350-351 (1997).
103. For a discussion of the decriminalisation of certain types of gay sex and the
unsuccessful campaign for sexuality discrimination legislation in Hong Kong, see
Carole J. Petersen, Values in Transition: the Development of the Gay and Lesbian
Rights Movement in Hong Kong, 19 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 337 (1997).
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becoming more visible in the debate on human rights in Hong
Kong."° Although the majority of associations that serve foreign
domestic helpers are social or service oriented, some have explicitly
political intentions, which may include lobbying against reductions in
the minimum statutory wage or against examples of discrimination
against them."' Some local women's groups have supported the
foreign domestic helpers in their campaigns. 6 However, it cannot be
said that Hong Kong women generally support the foreign domestic
helpers, and their interests do often conflict. For example,
unemployed local women view foreign domestic helpers as a source
of competition, and women who employ foreign domestic helpers
regularly argue that their minimum wage should be reduced in the
current economic recession.
Given their diversity, Hong Kong NGOs have done a reasonably
good job of banding together on certain key issues. Many diverse
groups lobbied for the extension of CEDAW to Hong Kong, the
enactment of the Sex Discrimination Ordinance, and the creation of a
Women's Commission." And while many organizations, particularly
those that operate exclusively in Chinese, still lack adequate
information on CEDAW, a significant number have already taken an
active role in the CEDAW enforcement process. In this context,
Hong Kong has benefited enormously from the presence of Andrew
Byrnes, an Australian lawyer who was a member of the Faculty of
Law at the University of Hong Kong from 1989-2001. Byrnes is a
104. See, e.g, Carol G.S. Tan, Why Rights Are Not Enjoyed: The Case of Foreign
Domestic Helpers, 30 H.K. L.J. 354 (2000); Raymond Wacks, Domestic Helpers' Pri-
vacy, 30 H.K. L.J. 361 (2000).
105. See NICOLE CONSTABLE, MADE To ORDER IN HONG KONG: STORIES OF
FILIPINA WORKERS 168 (1997).
106. See, e.g., COALITION FOR MIGRANTS RIGHTS, STATEMENT ON THE 111"
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR DAY (May 1, 2001), available at http://www/asian-
migrants.org/news/98869909818798.php (last visited Feb. 24, 2003). This statement
was endorsed by numerous organisations, including some local Hong Kong groups,
such as the Movement Against Discrimination and the Association for the Advance-
ment of Feminism.
107. See, e.g., The Platform of the Hong Kong Coalition of Women's Organiza-
tions: The Need for Legislation Prohibiting Discrimination on All Grounds Related to
Gender (1995), signed by thirteen women's organizations (both English-speaking and
Chinese speaking groups) and submitted to the Legislative Council's Bills Committee
to study the Equal Opportunities Bill. See also HONG KONG WOMEN'S COALITION
ON EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES, NGO REPORT ON WOMEN IN HONG KONG (originally
written for the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, September 1995 and
updated for the Second East Asian Women's Forum, August 22-24, 1996) (on file
with authors).
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recognised expert on CEDAW"' and has worked with many
members of the CEDAW Committee.' 9  Before CEDAW was
extended to Hong Kong, he organised regular conferences and
seminars on the human rights treaties that did apply to Hong Kong
(such as the ICCPR and the ICESCR). He also encouraged NGOs,
including women's organizations, to draft shadow reports and helped
to submit them to the relevant treaty bodies. Byrnes also invited
international experts on equality issues to come to Hong Kong to
speak at conferences and meet with local women's groups. Thus, by
the time that CEDAW was actually extended to Hong Kong in 1996,
a small core of women's groups were reasonably well versed in its
potential, and were somewhat familiar with the reporting process for
international human rights conventions.
Given this familiarity, several women's groups were anticipating
Hong Kong's Initial Report to the CEDAW Committee, which was
due in October 1997. Unfortunately, public commentary on the
report was somewhat hampered by the short period of time between
the date that the report became available and the dates of the
hearings before the CEDAW Committee. This was not actually the
fault of the Hong Kong government. The Home Affairs Branch
followed the appropriate formal steps. It published a draft outline of
its report (although with very little text), added some items suggested
by women's organisations, and completed its report on time.
However, the Hong Kong government could not submit its report
directly to the United Nations since it is only a Special Administrative
108. For examples of his many publications in the field, see Using International
Human Rights Law and Procedures to Advance the Women's Human Rights, in
WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW - VOLUME 2: INTERNATIONAL
COURTS, INSTRUMENTS, AND ORGANISATIONS AND SELECT REGIONAL ISSUES
AFFECTING WOMEN 79-118 (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig eds., 2000); Human
Rights Instruments Relating Specifically to Women, With Particular Emphasis on The
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, in
ADVANCING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: USING INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
IN DOMESTIC LITIGATION: PAPERS AND STATEMENTS FROM THE ASIA/SOUTH PACIFIC
REGIONAL JUDICIAL COLLOQUIUM, HONG KONG 39-57 (May 20-22, 1996) (Andrew
Byrnes et al. eds., 1997), available at http://www.law-
lib.utoronto.ca/Diana/fulltext/byrne.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2003); and Andrew
Byrnes & Jane Connors, Enforcing the Human Rights of Women: A Complaints Pro-
cedure for the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women?, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 679 (1996).
109. Byrnes has a long association with the International Women's Rights Action
Watch (IWRAW), the international network that was one of the first NGOS to focus
on the Women's Convention and actively support the work of the CEDAW Commit-
tee.
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Region, and the Chinese national government held the Hong Kong
report without publishing it for almost one year, finally submitting it
in August 1998. This left only about four months for Hong Kong
NGOs to study the report, organise forums, and draft shadow reports.
Although the delay in submitting Hong Kong's report may have
been deliberate, it was probably due simply to the desire of the
national government to submit the Hong Kong report together with
the update to China's third and fourth reports. But whatever the
cause, the incident says something quite important about the
difference between treaty obligations in Hong Kong and the rest of
China. The national government would not see the need to publish a
treaty report well before the Committee hearings because individuals
and local organisations are not allowed to criticise it in any event.
This is something that will hopefully change in China in the long
term. However, in the short term, the Hong Kong government needs
to make it clear to the national government (applying the principle of
"one-country-two-systems") that the Hong Kong CEDAW report
must be distributed promptly to the local community, allowing more
time for public discussion before the CEDAW Committee meets in
New York.
Despite the short time available, Andrew Byrnes and his
colleagues at the University of Hong Kong did organise a conference on
Hong Kong's Initial Report (held in November 1998), and a number of
NGOs participated. As Erickson and Byrnes have discussed this
particular conference in a previous article,"' we will not discuss it in
detail here. However, it is noteworthy that Dr. Carmel Shalev, the
member of the CEDAW Committee who was serving as country
reporter for China, accepted the university's invitation and traveled to
Hong Kong for the conference. Dr. Shalev addressed the conference,
listened to the NGO papers, and also met with many local NGOs.'11
Given Hong Kong's small size and the last-minute nature of the
conference, this was very fortunate and it certainly helped to raise the
profile of the Hong Kong NGOs with the CEDAW Committee. Ten
NGOs (with quite diverse membership) banded together to produce a
major shadow report, which was very critical of the government.' 2 The
110. See Moana Erickson & Andrew Byrnes, Hong Kong and the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 29 H.K. L.J. 350 (1999).
111. The CEDAW website of the Centre for Comparative and Public Law, Univer-
sity of Hong Kong, at http://www.hku.hk/ccpl/cedaw.htm, lists papers from the semi-
nar, as well as other materials relevant to CEDAW in Hong Kong.
112. See Submission to the CEDAW Committee on the Initial Report on Hong
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Home Affairs Panel of the Hong Kong Legislative Council also held
hearings on the government report and encouraged NGOs to make
submissions to the Panel. Although the government representatives
who attended these hearings did not agree with the criticisms of the
NGOs, they were compelled to give detailed responses and justify the
positions taken in the government's written report to the CEDAW
Committee.
The Hong Kong Equal Opportunities Commission also joined
this lobbying effort, submitting its own NGO Report to the local
conference, to the legislature,"3 and to the CEDAW Committee."
4
This was an important step in the development of the Equal
Opportunities Commission, as it had been criticised by women's groups
in its early years as being too timid. In its shadow report, the Equal
Opportunities Commission condemned certain government policies
and disagreed with the government's assessment of gender equality in
Hong Kong. While some women's organisations thought that the
Commission's report could have been more comprehensive, they
were encouraged by the fact that it was willing to confront the
government in an international forum. Most importantly, the Equal
Opportunities Commission threw its full weight behind the women's
groups' demand that a Women's Commission be created. The
government had claimed that there was no need for a Women's
Commission because certain top level "Policy Groups" in the
government already provided the necessary co-ordination on
women's issues among the various bureaus."5 However, the Equal
Opportunities Commission took issue with this statement, noting in
its shadow report that it was not aware of any Policy Group within
government that "specifically and regularly addresses matters of
Kong Under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women by Non-Governmental Organisations (1998), available at
http://www.hku.hk/ccpl/cedaw/cedaw4.html (endorsed by Association for the Ad-
vancement of Feminism, Hong Kong Women Workers Association, Hong Kong
Women Christian Association, Hong Kong Federation of Women's Centres, Associa-
tion Concerning Sexual Violence Against Women, Hong Kong Association for the
Survivors of Sexual Women Abuse, Family Ideal Community Education Project,
Queer Sisters, Ziteng, and Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor) (last visited Feb. 24,
2003).
113. See Initial Report, supra note 77.
114. See EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES COMMISSION, NGO REPORT ON THE CONVENTION
ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN (Nov.
1998), available at www.eoc.org.hk/CE/cedaw (last visited Feb. 24, 2003) [hereinafter
NGO REPORT].
115. Initial Report, supra, note 77, 19.
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concern for women." '116 It also noted that in the absence of a
Women's Commission the NGOs were turning to the Equal
Opportunities Commission. This was problematic because its powers
were mainly limited to enforcing the Sex Discrimination Ordinance
and it had very little influence over government policy making.
In addition to drafting shadow reports, a number of NGO
representatives also took the initiative to travel to New York in early
1999, where they held an informal briefing for Committee members on
Hong Kong issues and attended the Committee's hearing on the Hong
Kong report. The impact of the NGO reports and briefings could be
seen in the questions asked by the CEDAW Committee. Although the
hearing on Hong Kong's Initial Report was a part of the combined third
and fourth periodic reports of China, a separate half-day was set aside
for Hong Kong. This was a significant amount of time given that only
one and a half days were devoted to China as a whole. This may be
partly attributable to the fact that it was Hong Kong's first report and to
China's desire to illustrate the success of the "one-country-two-systems"
model (something that Ambassador Qin Huasun pointed to in his
opening statement). "7 However, we would argue that the time given to
the Hong Kong report was also a function of the amount of information
fed to it by NGOs. In contrast, since there are no truly independent
NGOs providing information from within the rest of China, the
Committee has to rely on a combination of the government's report and
international NGOs.118
Members of the CEDAW Committee asked the Hong Kong
government representatives several difficult questions. The
government officials were well prepared and generally had long
rehearsed answers. (The Home Affairs Branch of the Hong Kong
Government has become quite skilled at producing long reports and
rehearsed answers for the international human rights monitoring bodies
since a good deal of attention has been paid to Hong Kong by these
monitoring bodies in the last fifteen years.) Nonetheless, the
Committee pursued the key issues in its Concluding Comments."9 For
116. NGO REPORT, supra, note 114, 4.
117. Erickson & Byrnes, supra note 110, at 361.
118. See, for example, the shadow report prepared by the New-York based group
Human Rights in China, entitled Human Rights Report on Implementation of Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women in the
People's Republic of China, available at http://www.HRIChina.org (last visited Feb.
24, 2003).
119. See CEDAW Report, supra note 42, I 308-336.
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example, the Committee noted that Hong Kong's current electoral
system-in which one-half of the legislators are elected by professional
groups and other "functional constituencies"-tends to discriminate
against women. It also recommended that the government amend the
Domestic Violence Ordinance in order to expand its coverage and
provide for treatment and counseling of offenders, enhance services for
victims of domestic violence, take steps to protect commercial sex
workers and women migrant workers from abuse, and amend the
statutory definition of rape so as to make clear that rape within
marriage is a criminal offence.'2' It also criticised the discrimination
against women in the Small House Policy which was included in Hong
Kong's reservations to CEDAW and also enjoys an express exemption
from the Sex Discrimination Ordinance.'22 Perhaps most importantly,
the CEDAW Committee urged the Hong Kong government to
establish a "high-level central mechanism with appropriate powers and
resources to develop and coordinate a women-focussed policy and long-
term strategy to ensure effective implementation of..." CEDAW.23
D. The Impact of CEDA W on Public Policy in Hong Kong
In contrast to the UK, the Concluding Comments of the
CEDAW Committee have been referred to in domestic policy
debates. For example, the Home Affairs Panel of the Legislative
Council held hearings to consider the Concluding Comments and
asked the government to respond to them.'24 Certain legislators
reiterated the Committee's call for the establishment of a women's
commission, and expressed doubt about the government's claim that
women's issues already received "high level" consideration by various
Policy Groups within the existing government structure. Legislators
120. Id. '[ 319.
121. Id. '119 323-328. It appears that the Committee did not fully understand the
state of Hong Kong law at the time as it expressed its concern that rape is not consid-
ered a criminal offence in Hong Kong. Id. T1 323. In fact, since the Hong Kong statute
was based upon English law, it is almost certain that a Hong Kong court would follow
the decision of the English House of Lords in R v. R, 1 A.C. 599, 614 (1992), and hold
that non-consensual sex between married persons constitutes rape. However, the
Committee's comment highlighted the lack of clarity on the topic and the need to ex-
pressly provide for this in the legislation, which the Hong Kong government is now do-
ing (as discussed later in this article).
122. Id. T1 333.
123. Id. T 317-318.
124. See Hong Kong Legislative Council, Panel on Home Affairs, Minutes of
Meeting, March 8,1999, Legco Paper No. CB(2) 1650/98-99.
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also challenged the government to provide examples of what these
unnamed Policy Groups had done to address women's issues.1
21
The Hong Kong government initially declined to adopt most of
the CEDAW Committee's Concluding Comments.'26 In particular,
the government continued to oppose creating a women's commission
for the reason that it would be a "duplication of efforts and a waste of
resources."'2 7 However, NGOs and legislators continued to press the
government, knowing that it would eventually want to show some
progress. In general, the government likes to promote Hong Kong as
a territory that adheres to human rights standards and takes the
international reporting process seriously. The resumption of Chinese
sovereignty has made it all the more important for Hong Kong to be
viewed as legitimate by the international human rights community.
Thus, it appeared likely that the Hong Kong government would want
to be able to point to at least one significant development in time for
the next international event in the field of women's rights.
Fortunately, the next such event was scheduled for June 2000.
"Beijing Plus 5" was the short name for a special session of the
United Nations entitled "Women 2000: Gender Equality,
Development and Peace for the Twenty-first Century." The five-day
session was designed to assess the progress made by governments
since the adoption of the Platform for Action, which had been
approved at the Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing
in September 1995.128 At the conference in Beijing, the Hong Kong
government had been able to report the recent enactment of the Sex
Discrimination Ordinance, as well as the arrangements to establish
the Equal Opportunities Commission and extend CEDAW to Hong
Kong.
125. Id. 16-17.
126. See HONG KONG GOVERNMENT, INITIAL RESPONSE TO THE CONCLUDING
COMMENTS, Legco Paper No. CB(2)1429/98-99(02) (attached as Annex D to the In-
formation Note provided by the Home Affairs Bureau to the Legislative Council
Panel on Home Affairs for its meeting on Mar. 8, 1999), available at
www.legco.gov.hk (last visited Feb. 24, 2003).
127. See Responses to Written Questions Raised by the UN Committee on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women on the Initial Report on
the HKSAR under CEDAW, Legco Paper No. CB(2)1429/98-99(02), at A43 (at-
tached to the Information Note provided by the Home Affairs Bureau to the Legisla-
tive Council Panel on Home Affairs for its meeting of Mar. 8, 1999), available at
www.legco.gov.hk (last visited Feb. 24, 2003).
128. For further information, see the website of the United Nations Development
Programme, at http://www.undp.org/gender/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2003).
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However, five years later, the government itself had not done a
great deal more to implement the Beijing Platform for Action. This
gave women's organisations a particularly good opportunity to lobby
the government to make some positive response to the Concluding
Comments of the CEDAW Committee. Further pressure was put on
the Hong Kong government when a local conference was planned in
preparation for Beijing Plus 5 (organised by the Equal Opportunities
Commission, the Women's Coalition on Equal Opportunities, and the
University of Hong Kong). A few weeks before this conference, the
Chief Secretary for Administration, the second-highest position in the
executive branch, held by Mrs. Anson Chan at the time, offered to
give an opening address. She used the address as an opportunity to
announce the creation of a Women's Commission. This was another
important achievement for Hong Kong women. Given the
government's previous opposition, it almost certainly would not have
come about this quickly but for the fact that NGOs and the Equal
Opportunities Commission had emphasised the issue so strongly in
their shadow reports to the CEDAW Committee, causing the
Committee to stress the point in its Concluding Comments. 9 Of
course, the follow-up by NGOs and legislators, after the Concluding
Comments were issued, was equally important.The Women's Commission was formally established in 2001 and
thus far has not had a significant impact, at least not from the point of
view of women's organisations.3' Several Hong Kong women's
groups have criticised its membership, which they fear is too
conservative and not sufficiently experienced in women's issues.
Their concerns were exacerbated when the first Chairwoman of the
Women's Commission, Mrs. Sophie Leung, disassociated herself from
the feminist movement in an interview held shortly after she was
appointed.' This comment led one female legislator directly to
129. For examples of how the Hong Kong government highlighted its decision to
finally create a Women's Commission as an example of its response to the CEDAW
Committee's Concluding Comments, see Progress Report for the LegCo Panel on
Home Affairs, Legco Paper No. CB(2)2159/99-00(02), '1%4-5 (submitted to legislators
for discussion on June 2, 2000), available at http://www.legco.gov.hk (last visited Feb.
24, 2003); and The Report of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Govern-
ment on the Implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action (May 2000), available
at http://www.hwfb.gov.hk/hw/english/archive/other.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2003).
130. See the Women's Commission website for general information, at
http://www.women.gov.hk/eng/home.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2003).
131. See Lilian Kwok, Feminism Not My Way, H.K. iMAIL, May 2, 2001, available
at http://www.aaf.org.hk/english/page5-hot.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2003).
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condemn the entire Women's Commission as a form of "window
dressing," which would not enhance gender equality.32  The
placement of the Women's Commission within the structure of the
government has also been somewhat controversial.'33  It is
"independent" but serviced by the Health and Welfare Branch.
Some activists have told us that they fear the Commission will focus
entirely upon service issues, with little emphasis on political
empowerment or any other issue that might bring it into conflict with
existing government policies.
3 1
However, in our view, it is much too early to draw any
conclusions regarding the impact of the Women's Commission. The
Equal Opportunities Commission was also initially considered too
timid but has now established itself as being quite assertive.
Moreover, there may be some advantages to having a Women's
Commission that can work on the inside of government. The
enforcement role of the Equal Opportunities Commission naturally
makes certain government officials rather suspicious of it, especially
since it has now successfully sued the government in two major
cases.135  In contrast, government officials view the Women's
Commission as being less threatening. Thus, it may be able to
achieve more progress with respect to goals that require persuasion
and co-operation. For example, the Women's Commission has made
the introduction of "gender mainstreaming" into government policy
one of its first major projects. The success of this project will be one
of the first indications of its ability to be an agent for change in Hong
Kong society. In May 2002, the Women's Commission also held a
132. Id.
133. See Hong Kong Report 1998-2000, available at
http://members.hknet.com/-hkwomen/womenrpt9800.html (endorsed by ten
women's organisations noting their fear that the Women's Commission would be at
too low a level in the government and would focus only on health and welfare issues)
(last visited Feb. 24, 2003).
134. For various public statements on the Women's Commission issued by the
AAF and the recently formed Hong Kong Women's Coalition on Equal Opportuni-
ties (which regularly comments upon the work of the Women's Commission), see
AAF, supra note 99.
135. One of these cases, Equal Opportunities Commission v. Director of Education
2 H.K. L.R.D. 690 (2001), is discussed later in this article. In the other case, KY and
W v. Secretary for Justice, 3 H.K. L.R.D. 777 (2000), the Equal Opportunities success-
fully litigated under the Disability Discrimination Ordinance on behalf of three plain-
tiffs, each of whom had been denied jobs in a government department because he
had a mother or father with a history of mental illness. For an analysis of these cases,
see Carole J. Petersen, The Right to Equality in Hong Kong's Public Sector: An As-
sessment of Post-Colonial Hong Kong, 32 H.K. L.J. 103 (2002).
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major conference in Hong Kong, at which representatives of women's
groups had the opportunity to comment on the work it has done so
far and to suggest future projects.
One disturbing sign is that the actual terms of reference of the
Women's Commission do not even mention CEDAW. 13 6 There are
also very few references to CEDAW on the Women's Commission's
website. Based upon our conversations with certain members of the
Women's Commission, it appears that the Commission has not yet
given much express consideration to CEDAW or to the role that it
will play in the CEDAW reporting process. This is surprising, given
that it was established to be the national enforcement mechanism for
CEDAW in Hong Kong. Hopefully, the Commission will start to
consider CEDAW more actively in the next year, as the due date for
Hong Kong's second periodic report draws closer. It will be
interesting to see if the Women's Commission writes its own shadow
report, one that actually critiques the government. If it fails to do so,
it may lose enormous credibility with the local women's movement.
In preparing its shadow report, the Women's Commission could
conduct a consultation exercise similar to that of the WNC in the UK.
The Women's Commission could also conduct training sessions on
CEDAW, and improve the quality of the government's publicity
materials on the treaty. The government is keenly aware of its
obligation to publicise CEDAW, but thus far has done so largely by
distributing fairly childish paraphernalia including CEDAW mouse
pads, cartoons, coasters, and even board games. More than one NGO
has complained to us that these items do not teach women anything
about the content or the potential of CEDAW. Better information,
particularly in Chinese, would enable a broader range of women's
organisations to become involved in the CEDAW enforcement process.
In addition to creating the Women's Commission, the Hong Kong
government has taken certain other limited steps to respond to the
CEDAW Committee's Concluding Comments. For example, the
CEDAW Committee called for more active implementation of the
principle of "equal pay for work of equal value," required by Article
11(d) of CEDAW, and the government agreed to co-operate with a
study by the Equal Opportunities Commission on the extent to which
136. The terms of reference can be found on the Women's Commission's website,
available at http://www.women.gov.hk/women/eng/about.htm (last visited Feb. 24,
2003).
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the principle is being followed in the public sector."7 The government
has provided extensive salary data and also allowed outside consultants
to conduct job evaluation interviews. However, as of this writing, the
results of the study had not been released."'
The Hong Kong government also agreed to amend the statutory
definition of rape. It had initially maintained that there was no need to
amend the legislation because the Hong Kong courts would almost
certainly follow the decision of the English House of Lords in R v. R,"'
which held that rape was possible within marriage despite the reference
to "unlawful" sex in the statutory definition. In fact, the government
was probably correct about this but the statute did arguably create
uncertainty in this respect. In any event, after receiving the CEDAW
Committee's Concluding Comments, the government proposed
legislative amendments to put the matter beyond doubt. '
Perhaps the most important result of these policy developments is
that they have shown women's groups that the CEDAW reporting
process can have some impact upon the government. The NGOs that
banded together to write the shadow report will almost certainly
continue to participate in future reviews of Hong Kong by the
CEDAW Committee. Moreover, many representatives of women's
groups have expressed a desire for more information and training on
CEDAW, so that they can make greater use of it in future campaigns.
It has also been suggested that NGOs, the Equal Opportunities
Commission, and the Women's Commission should band together to
conduct an annual review of government efforts to implement
137. See CEDAW Report, supra note 42, at 331-332.
138. There is no doubt that the Sex Discrimination Ordinance requires (in both
the public and private sectors) equal pay for equal work, because Section 11 prohibits
discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment. The question of whether
it also requires equal pay for work of equal value has not yet been tested. For a dis-
cussion of this issue, see Carole J. Petersen, Implementing Equal Pay for Work of
Equal Value in Hong Kong: A Feminist Analysis, in Proceedings - Equal Pay for
Work of Equal Value: A Conference Organised by the Equal Opportunities Com-
mission (2000), available at http://www.eoc.org.hk/ME/conference/index.htm (last
visited Feb. 24, 2003).
139. R.v.R., 1 A.C. 599, 614 (1992).
140. For an analysis of this legislative effort (and some of the complications that
arose with respect to the element of "unlawful" in certain other sexual offences), see
Robyn Emerton, Marital Rape and the Related Sexual Offences: A Review of the Pro-
posed Amendments to Part XII of the Crimes Ordinance, 31 H.K. L.J. 415 (2001). As
of this writing, the government had decided to adopt a simpler approach, by leaving
the element of "unlawful" in the definition of rape and various other offences but
adding a provision to the effect that "for the avoidance of doubt," sex without con-
sent within marriage constitutes rape.
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E. Judicial Use of CEDA W in Hong Kong
The Hong Kong Sex Discrimination Ordinance does not contain
a provision expressly stating that it must be interpreted to comply
with the Convention. The government successfully opposed
amendments proposed by Anna Wu and the Bills Committee that
would have added such language. However, this does not prevent the
courts from referring to CEDAW when interpreting domestic
legislation, since it is a general rule of statutory construction that the
legislature is presumed to intend to conform to public international
law."' Thus, if "one of the meanings which can be ascribed to the
legislation is consonant with the treaty obligation and another or
others are not, the meaning which is consonant is to be preferred." '43
Moreover, when the Hong Kong government announced that it
would propose the Sex Discrimination Bill, it expressly informed the
legislature that it was doing so in order to comply with CEDAW,
which, by that time, the government had conceded would soon be
extended to Hong Kong.'" In its Initial Report to the CEDAW
141. In April 2002, Ms. Shanthi Dairiam, the Executive Director of the Kuala Lum-
pur-based International Women's Rights Action Watch Asia Pacific (known as
IWRAW AP), visited Hong Kong and participated in a conference organised by the
Centre for Comparative and Public Law, University of Hong Kong. Representatives of
the Women's Commission, the Equal Opportunities Commission, and several women's
organisations participated. One of the conclusions of the conference report was that
there should be an annual review of the extent to which CEDAW is being implemented
in Hong Kong and broader training of NGO representatives on how to participate in
the CEDAW process. See Conference Report: Equality and Non-discrimination: The
Two Essential Principles for the Promotion and Protection of the Human Rights of
Women (Centre for Comparative and Public Law and the Women's Studies Research
Centre, University of Hong Kong) (Apr. 20, 2002) (on file with author).
142. See R v. Sin Yau-ming, 1 H.K. P.L.R. 88, 105 (1991). See also Garland v. British
Rail Engineering Ltd (No 2), 2 A.C. 751, T 90 (H.L. 1983); Francis A. R. Bennion,
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: A CODE § 270, at 630-635 (3d ed. 1997).
143. Salomon v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise, 2 Q.B. 116, 143 (1967) (Diplock
L.J.).
144. In 1994, the government informed the Legislative Council that "we will need to in-
troduce some form of legislation prohibiting discrimination, which would include equal pay
legislation, before CEDAW is formally extended to Hong Kong." See Home Affairs
Branch, Legislative Council Brief- Equal Opportunities for Women and Men, T 10 (June
1994), reprinted as Doc. No. 27, at 336, in HONG KONG EQUAL OPPORTUNITY LAw-
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY ARCHIVE 1993-1997 (Centre for Comparative and Public Law,
University of Hong Kong 1999). Similarly, a government press release of June 3,1994 stated
that the "institution of sex discrimination legislation is a means to implement the provisions
of CEDAW." Id. Doc. No. 26, at 333-335.
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Committee, the government has also cited the Sex Discrimination
Ordinance as its principle means of implementing the treaty Hong
Kong.
Interestingly, the first judicial reliance upon CEDAW arose in a
case against the government. The controversy started in 1998, when
the Equal Opportunities Commission launched its first formal
investigation into the Education Department's system of allocating
students to secondary schools. Hong Kong's system of secondary
schools is extremely hierarchical, with "band 1" schools ranking the
highest and "band 5" schools ranking the lowest.' Students are
assessed at the completion of primary school, and are "banded" at the
tender age of eleven. Students and their parents work very hard to
prepare for these assessments, as the band to which a student is
assigned is extremely important to her future opportunities. A
student who is placed in band 1 will be admitted to a highly ranked
secondary school, and is almost certain to go on to university and a
bright future.
Until recently, it was widely believed that the students were
allocated to each band entirely on the basis of merit. However, male
and female students were able to compare their scores and relative
bandings in 1998, when they obtained access to the results of the
banding exercises for the first time. The Equal Opportunities
Commission began receiving complaints from female students who
alleged that they had been rejected from elite secondary schools while
boys with lower scores had been admitted. The Equal Opportunities
Commission thus conducted its first formal investigation, and
determined that the system violated the Sex Discrimination
Ordinance. In general, female students completing primary school
performed better than male students on the relevant assessments.
However, the Education Department had for years been secretly
scaling the results on the basis of gender. It was also banding male
and female students separately and was applying gender quotas to the
elite schools. The purpose of these three mechanisms was to ensure
that girls did not obtain a majority of the places in the higher-ranked
secondary schools, which the government admitted they would have
otherwise obtained.'46 Although individual boys suffered from the
145. At the time of the litigation, there were five bands. However, since that time
the government has reduced the number of bands to three.
146. See EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES COMMISSION, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: FORMAL
INVESTIGATION INTO THE SECONDARY SCHOOL PLACES ALLOCATION SYSTEM, ch. 4, IT
24, 29 (1999), available at http://www.eoc.org.hk/ME/investigation/index.htm (last vis-
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process in some school nets, more girls were adversely affected
because they were required to achieve better scores than boys to be
placed in a particular band in most school nets.
When the Equal Opportunities Commission released the report
on its formal investigation in August 1999, it created enormous
controversy. At first, the government assured legislators that it would
reform the allocation system.'47  However, in early 2000, the
government announced that it had obtained new legal advice and
would seek to justify the system. The Equal Opportunities
Commission eventually applied for judicial review, and in May 2001,
the court issued a declaration that all three elements of the
government's allocation system were unlawful.4 ' The Equal
Opportunities Commission relied extensively upon CEDAW and
other international jurisprudence in its submissions and the court
took the opportunity to hold that the Sex Discrimination Ordinance
should be interpreted, where reasonably capable of bearing such a
meaning, so as to carry out Hong Kong's obligations under
CEDAW.
149
The court's reliance upon CEDAW had a significant impact
upon the government's defences. The government's first alternative
defence was that boys develop later than girls and that the gender-
based mechanisms applied by the government only took away the
"artificial" and temporary advantage that girls enjoy. The Equal
Opportunities Commission submitted expert evidence to refute the
theory that Hong Kong boys are "late bloomers" that catch up with
girls in secondary school.5  However, the court held that the
government's theory would not, in any event, make gender-based
scaling any less discriminatory because generalised assumptions about
male and female development cannot justify less favourable
treatment of particular girls. In so holding, the court relied in part
ited Feb. 24, 2003).
147. See Secretary for Education and Manpower, Address at the Hong Kong Han-
sard (Nov. 11, 1999) (responding to a motion by legislator Christine Loh and the
speech of legislator Yeung Yiu-chung). English translation available at
http://www.yeungyiuchung.org.hk/edebate/ye036.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2003).
148. Equal Opportunities Commission v. Director of Education, 2 H.K. L.R.D. 690
(2001), available at http://www.eoc.org.hk/ME/case/index.htm (last visited Feb. 24,
2003).
149. Id. T 90,109.
150. For example, the Equal Opportunities Commission's expert witness per-
formed an analysis of public examination results that showed that Hong Kong girls
continue to out-perform boys throughout secondary school. See id. T 132.
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upon Article 10 of CEDAW, which provides that State Parties have
an obligation to eliminate stereotyped concepts of men and women.
The court also relied upon CEDAW when considering the
Education Department's main defence, which, was that the gender-
based mechanisms fell within the exemption for special measures
(voluntary affirmative action) provided in Section 48 of the Sex
Discrimination Ordinance. The court could have rejected the
government's defence on the ground that CEDAW does not permit
special measures for boys, but rather only for girls or women. '
However, the court relied upon another factor, which is that the
government's system appeared to establish permanent special
treatment for boys. Since affirmative action is normally only
considered justifiable when it is used to overcome the effects of past
discrimination, the intention should be to return to equal treatment
once an "equal playing field" has been established.
Although the words "temporary" do not appear in Section 48
itself, the court held that this meaning may be inferred by reference
to CEDAW. Article 4 of CEDAW provides that special measures
"shall in no way entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal
or separate standards; these measures shall be discontinued when the
objectives of equality of opportunity and treatment have been
achieved." The court held that the government's system offended
this principle because the Director of Education had been using
gender-based mechanisms to assist boys for almost twenty years and
intended to maintain them for the indefinite future.
However, the court also held that even if no reference to
CEDAW had been made, the section 48 defense would fail because
the government had not shown that the departure from equal
treatment was a rational and proportionate response to the perceived
problem of boys' poorer performance. '52 It also noted that it was a
matter of "considerable disquiet" that none of three gender-based
mechanisms in the Secondary Schools Placement Allocation system
151. See Andrew Byrnes, Affirmative Action, Hong Kong Law, and the SSPA, pre-
sented at Equal Opportunities in Education: Boys and Girls in the 21st Century (con-
ference organised by the Hong Kong Equal Opportunities Commission) (Nov. 8,
1999), available at http://www.eoc.org.hk/ME/conference/index.htm (last visited Feb.
24, 2003).
152. See Equal Opportunities Commission v. Director of Education, supra note
148, $1 116. In particular, the government failed to prove that boys caught up with
girls academically later in life. The system was also found to be irrational in that it
primarily assisted the boys in the top thirty percent of the class and could actually pe-
nalise the other boys.
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were actually intended to assist boys to overcome whatever caused
them to perform at a lower standard than girls. Rather, the
government had simply developed allocation mechanisms to
"manufacture an advantage in favour of one gender at the intended
expense of the other.
' 53
The court's decision was an important victory for the Equal
Opportunities Commission. However, it was equally important for
having set the more general precedent that the Sex Discrimination
Ordinance should be interpreted, where possible, so as to carry out
Hong Kong's obligations under CEDAW. Providing that the courts
of Hong Kong maintain their independence from the government
(which we would argue they have done so far, despite the fact that
Hong Kong is now a part of the People's Republic of China15 4), we
would expect the courts to continue to rely upon CEDAW when
interpreting the Sex Discrimination Ordinance. One advantage of the
fact that the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance 1991 was largely
copied from the ICCPR is that Hong Kong courts are now very
accustomed to submissions based upon international human rights law.
In R v. Sin Yau Ming,5' an early case applying the Bill of Rights
Ordinance, the Hong Kong Court of Appeal held that when
interpreting the Bill of Rights, Hong Kong courts may derive assistance
from the decisions of courts in other countries with entrenched bills of
rights, as well as the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights
and European Human Rights Commission, and the decisions and
comments of the United Nations Human Rights Committee. While
none of these sources are binding, the Court of Appeal held that they
should be given "considerable weight." Some scholars have complained
that there has been a decline since Sin Yau Ming in Hong Kong courts'
willingness to embrace international jurisprudence. However, there is
no doubt that the introduction of the Bill of Rights did make Hong
Kong lawyers and judges much more aware of the body of international
153. See id. 136.
154. There have been concerns about the independence of the Hong Kong judici-
ary, particularly after the constitutional crisis surrounding the "right of abode" cases,
in which the Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress exercised its
power under Article 158 of the Basic Law (at the request of the Hong Kong govern-
ment) to override an interpretation of the Basic Law given by the Hong Kong Court
of Final Appeal. A good deal has been written about this controversy. For a collec-
tion of documents and essays on both sides of the debate, see M.M. CHAN ET AL.,
HONG KONG'S CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE: CONFLICT OVER INTERPRETATION (2000).
155. R. v. Sin Yau Ming, 1 H.K. P.L.R. 88,107 (1991).
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law regarding human rights.'56 This may be one reason that the Hong
Kong judiciary has been quicker than the UK judiciary to rely upon
CEDAW when interpreting domestic legislation.
V. Conclusions
In our overview of the First CEDAW Impact Study,'57 we reflect
on the factors that contribute to the effectiveness of the CEDAW in
different jurisdictions. We list eight factors, many of which relate to
NGOs. For example, we stress the importance of NGO participation
in the reporting process; constructive dialogue between all parties and
NGOs; the ability of NGOs to use the Concluding Comments as a
lobbying tool; and a general recognition by NGOs of the strategic use
of international conventions.
Our study of Hong Kong and the UK confirms the importance of
NGOs in the CEDAW enforcement process. Although Hong Kong has
enjoyed CEDAW for a much shorter period of time, CEDAW has
arguably already had more direct impact in Hong Kong than in the
UK.' In our view, this is largely because Hong Kong women's
organisations were galvanised by the enormous campaign to persuade
the government to accept CEDAW and are now more enthusiastic
about learning to use it. In contrast, UK NGOs have not shown the
same awareness of CEDAW, and have not used the reporting process
as effectively to hold the government to account.
The growing interest in human rights in the last decade is one
factor that Hong Kong and the UK both share, although for different
reasons. Hong Kong's interest in human rights can be traced to
anxieties surrounding the "handover" to China in 1997 and the
156. Byrnes has concluded that although the outcomes in many cases do not re-
flect a true understanding, the courts in Hong Kong have at least shown that they are
"open to a consideration of a wide range of international source material and com-
parative case law that barely figured at all in the pre-1991 case law" of Hong Kong.
See Andrew Byrnes, Jumpstarting the Hong Kong Bill of Rights in its Second Decade?
The Relevance of International and Comparative Jurisprudence, presented at A Dec-
ade of the Bill of Rights and the ICCPR in Hong Kong: Review and Prospects (Cen-
tre for Comparative and Public Law, University of Hong Kong) (Jan. 12, 2002),
available at http://hku.hk/ccpl/pub/conf/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2003).
157. First CEDA W Impact Study, supra note 57, at 18.
158. This is particularly interesting because the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Race Discrimination (which was extended to Hong Kong in
1969, when it was ratified by the British government) has made almost no practical dif-
ference, demonstrated by the fact that Hong Kong still has no race discrimination legisla-
tion that applies to the private sector.
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resulting enactment of the Bill of Rights Ordinance 1991. The greater
interest within the UK has been brought about by the enactment of
the Human Rights Act 1998. In both societies, these events have
created opportunities for women's organisations to make greater use
of international instruments to promote their own agendas.
However, while many Hong Kong women's organisations looked to
CEDAW to provide the international standards necessary to improve
women's rights in the territory, women in the UK have tended to rely
more upon the domestic political process. When they do look outside
the borders, UK women's groups have tended to rely more upon the
law of the European Union and especially the European Convention
on Human Rights. While this approach is appropriate in many
instances, it is important to keep in mind the full range of
international documents available. As the CEDAW Committee
observed, the European Convention is primarily concerned with civil
and political rights, and it does not address many of the social and
economic rights dealt with by CEDAW. A policy of elevating the
European Convention, while paying little attention to CEDAW,
could arguably marginalise social and economic rights to the
detriment of women.1 59
The promotion of CEDAW as a Bill of Rights for Women can
help to put economic and social rights more on a par with civil and
political rights. The Concluding Comments and General
Recommendations of the CEDAW Committee can be fed into policy
debates. Eventually, judges, lawyers, and activists may also refer to
the CEDAW Committee's opinions on cases or inquiries under the
Optional Protocol. For example, Article 4 might be used in
campaigns to allow temporary special measures to encourage greater
female representation in the legislature. Similarly, Article 11 has
given the Hong Kong Equal Opportunities Commission support for
its current study of the extent to which "equal pay for work of equal
value" is being achieved in the Hong Kong public sector.
Of course, it is arguable that UK women simply have less need
than Hong Kong women for the standards that CEDAW has
established. UK women enjoy a fully democratic system and have
had a domestic sex discrimination law since 1975. In contrast, Hong
Kong women used the campaign for CEDAW as an added reason to
enact the Sex Discrimination Ordinance, and have come to rely upon
international human rights bodies to provide a persuasive "critique"
159. MCCOLGAN, supra note 75.
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of the unelected Hong Kong government.
However, we would argue that participation in the CEDAW
enforcement process has value beyond the particular policy and legal
changes that it may help to bring about. One of the great values of
CEDAW is that it encourages women's movements to think in terms
of a global citizenship. By using international structures and
international standards to critique its own government, a women's
movement can help to advance the concept of universal human rights.
Using CEDAW as a lobbying tool or as part of a submission in
litigation strengthens the concept that human rights are not just
abstract ideas, but are concrete rights that can be applied within all
societies. It also encourages individuals and organisations to
exchange ideas with those in other societies. Ruth Lister maintains
that "the framework of global citizenship helps to focus on the
responsibilities of the more affluent nation-states towards those in the
'developing world' that lack the resources to translate human rights,
as defined in the UN Covenant, into effective citizenship rights."'6 ° In
our study, one of the interviewees from an environmental network
talked about the difficulties of making international ideas relevant to
local environmental groups. She argued that it was necessary to avoid
United Nations jargon and to find practical and meaningful messages.
She gave an example of a campaign against pesticides that
emphasised not only the harm done to women in Britain eating the
product, but also the harm to those women spraying the pesticide in
the third world. The slogan was "it hurts you over here and them
over there." Finding these links is one way to persuade people to take
notice of what is happening in the international community. If
CEDAW were used more widely through the legal and political
systems of all countries, it would add to the weight of the document as
an international Bill of Rights for women.
An increase in the use of CEDAW within the domestic sphere is
also consistent with the UK government's foreign policy and with
Hong Kong's approach to its external affairs and international image.
Since 1997, the UK's Labour government has regarded human rights
as an integral part of that policy and has stated that the "human rights
of women are a special priority." The UK government also
acknowledges that its "credibility as an advocate of human rights in
the world is directly affected by our own record at home." 6' The
160. RUTH LISTER, CITIZENSHIP: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 60 (1997).
161. See FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE AND DEPARTMENT FOR
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government is committed to promoting CEDAW in its bilateral
relations, as part of its human rights policy, and arguably it should set
an example by encouraging the use of CEDAW within the UK. By
applying the General Recommendations of the Committee and using
the Concluding Comments, the UK government could show that it
had serious regard for the principles set forth in CEDAW. Similarly,
although the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region does not
have responsibility for foreign affairs under the terms of the Basic
Law, the Hong Kong government does like to present itself as acting
consistently with international human rights norms (thereby
maintaining a very different human rights record from mainland
China). Using CEDAW within the domestic sphere is entirely
consistent with these objectives.
CEDAW has the potential to make a difference in the law,
politics, and culture of a society. The study of Hong Kong and the
UK show that political will and the significance attached to United
Nations conventions are critical, as well as the use made of CEDAW
by NGOs. The creative and innovative use of CEDAW depends on
the will of the women's movement in the societies studied to persuade
governments that they should strive to meet the standards adopted in
this international bill of rights for women.
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, ANNUAL REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS, at 12-13
(July 1999), available at http://www.fco.gov.uk (last visited Feb. 24, 2003).
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